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LAYERS OF THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE ROLE OF LAW
IN JAPAN TODAY
Andrew M. Pardieck†
Abstract: In 1967, Professor Kawashima wrote about a world of vaguely defined
rights and norms in Japan. This article argues that world still exists. But it now co-exists
with a world that commonly defines rights, in great detail, and regularly invokes them.
There are layers of the law in Japan. Primary ordering of relationships and services is
often based on complex, legalistic contracts and regulation; secondary ordering is often
based on equity, Japanese notions of equity.
Examples from contract, employment, and environmental law and practice illustrate
this. For each, this paper examines both sides of the coin—transactional ordering and
litigated outcomes. Leases may be so detailed that they address liability for a broken
toilet paper holder. Yet, if challenged in court, leases may be re-written to reflect current
economic circumstances or the “consensus of society.” Employment contracts may start
with indemnification requirements and end with termination rights, but if they are
litigated, the courts will look for just cause. Volumes of regulation govern when a
nuclear reactor may operate, but the final decision is based on a “gentlemen’s agreement”
and local consensus.
As a result, negotiation occurs first in the shadow of detailed rights and obligations,
and, if contested, then in the shadow of law, equity, and local consensus. The role of law
in Japan has changed enormously since 1967, and will change in the decades to come, but
an accurate description of what it is now starts with Professor Kawashima’s discussion of
vaguely-defined rights and an understanding of the layers of the law described in this
paper.

†
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I.

INTRODUCTION

What is the role of law in a society where a residential lease contract
is so involved that it addresses toilet paper holders and shower hoses, yet an
unwritten “gentlemen’s agreement” governs operation of a nuclear power
plant? What is the role of law in a society where fifty-page contracts
governing employee relationships ignore decades of clearly established law?
How does one make sense of law in a society with a rapidly declining
general population and a rapidly increasing population of legal
professionals, or one with increasingly broad application of criminal law and
a decreasing prosecution rate?
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The writings on law and society in Japan are voluminous, but none
adequately answer these questions and describe the Japan that exists today.
One can’t ride the subways in Japan now without seeing advertisements for
attorneys. One can’t watch the news without hearing of Japanese who are
no longer willing to wait for or trust the government. One can’t sign a lease
or a services contract without sensing a gap between the academic literature
and the Japan that exists today. Working, living, or even visiting Japan
leaves one with the visceral sense that law in Japan is changing. This article
looks to explain some of those changes and proposes a different framework
for understanding the role that law plays in Japan today.
It does so by addressing both public and private law subjects and
examining both sides of the legal coin—transactional issues as well as
dispute resolution. Doing so suggests an explanation for how law functions
in Japan that differs from those offered by Professors Kawashima, Haley,
Ramseyer, and others who have commented on the “legal consciousness”
(hō ishiki) of the Japanese.
In 1967, Professor Kawashima published his work on the legal
consciousness of the Japanese, Nihonjin no Hōishiki, and it has been the
subject of debate since. 1 Despite wide criticism, it remains relevant—in
part. Professor Kawashima described a “pre-modern legal consciousness” in
Japan that created a rift between Japan’s modern codes, particularly the Civil
Code, and the world in which most Japanese lived. 2 He pointed to a
fundamental “gap” between “law at the normative level” and “law at the
[black] letter level.” 3 The Japanese, according to Professor Kawashima,
have a weak sense of individual rights.4 While rights under modern law are
based on objective standards defined at the level of the individual, Japanese
norms “compromise towards reality.”5 He points repeatedly to rights that
“exist but don’t exist” (aru yō na/nai yō na).6

1

See TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI iv (1967) [hereinafter KAWASHIMA,
NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI]. Professor Kawashima published a second, revised edition in 1987. Id. Professors
Feldman and Nottage have both summarized and reflected on this debate. See generally Eric A. Feldman,
Law, Culture, and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50
(Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007); Luke Nottage, The Cultural (Re)Turn in Japanese Law Studies, 39 VICTORIA
U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 755, 761-766 (2008). See also Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The
Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn To Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 33-36
(2006).
2
KAWASHIMA NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 4-5.
3
Id. at 197-98.
4
See id. at 15, 17, 19, 29. No term for “rights” even existed prior to the Meiji Reformation. Id. at
16.
5
Id. at 22-29.
6
Id. at 93, 104, 116, 139, 151.
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According to Professor Kawashima, while modern Japanese property
law recognizes comprehensive and exclusive ownership rights, traditional
Japan does not. 7 Urban Japanese leasing storage space in rural villages
during World War II found farmers wearing their clothing and using the
items being “stored.” 8 While modern contract law is premised on clear,
specific definitions of rights and obligations, Japanese practice is based on
informal agreements “where there is and there isn’t a contract,” and “where
there is and there isn’t a promise.”9 Storeowners who refuse to take back a
purchased item are “rigid and heartless.” 10 A government purchaser is a
superior party and expected to be receptive to entreaties by an inferior
contractor to modify the contract. 11
Promises are dependent on
12
relationships, and the contracts that result are indefinite, with “tentative”
(ichō) rights and liabilities.13
Professor Kawashima described dispute resolution in similar terms.
While courts find facts and clearly define rights, the Japanese prefer rights
and obligations that “exist but don’t exist.” 14 In conciliation, rights and
obligations are tentative and those unwilling to give ground heartless and
unyielding.15 The goal is “a rounded resolution” (maruku osameru), without
a determination of rights, which preserves the relationship and community. 16
Professor Kawashima also predicted change. He predicted an increase
in rights consciousness, leading to an increase in litigation.17 He anticipated
an increase in appeals to “legal standards,” an increase in demand for
authoritative decisions defining clear, fixed rights, and notions of individual
equality taking precedent over social relationships.18
Many have taken exception to Professor Kawashima’s description, in
particular, his suggestion of a cultural proclivity for conciliation rather than
litigation and a cultural preference for vague agreements over clear
contracts. Professor Haley came first, suggesting that there is no evidence
7

Id. at 66-69, 73.
Id.
9
Id. at 87, 93.
10
Id. at 94. An urban housewife who criticizes a farmer for selling potatoes that were promised to
her to another “lacks common sense.” A promise is a promise but it depends on the relationship. If it’s
between relatives or people of the same village, it is given greater weight. Id. at 92.
11
Id. at 1-2, 107, 116.
12
Id.
13
Id. The Japanese avoided specific, definite contracts because they precluded “flexibility” (yūtsū),
“entreaty” (kongan), and “favor” (onkei). Id. at 117.
14
Id. at 139.
15
Id. at 151.
16
Id. at 160, 167.
17
Id. at 186.
18
Id. at 187-88, 197.
8
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that the Japanese have a cultural aversion to litigation causing them to accept
mediated settlements less beneficial than judicial outcomes. 19 Surveys of
Japanese suggest a willingness to sue, and surveys of Japanese history
suggest a pattern of litigation.20 The difference in post-World War II Japan
is institutional incapacity. While there are social organizations conducive to
informal dispute resolution, there is not meaningful access to the courts.21
Professor Ramseyer has suggested that neither primacy of culture nor
primacy of costs explain low litigation rates in Japan. 22 According to
Professor Ramseyer, “the popular notion that the Japanese behave in ways
uncorrelated to judicial outcomes is flatly false.”23 According to Professor
Ramseyer, empirical evidence on litigation rates and settlement verdicts for
automobile accidents demonstrates a decreased need for formal judicial
process.24 Japanese settle disputes in light of readily predictable litigation
outcomes.25 They bargain in the shadow of the law, and they do so because
of efficiency, not inefficiency, in the formal process.26
Other Japanese law scholars have built on this discussion. Some have
offered “a political perspective.” 27 Professor Upham, reviewing the
government’s attempts to resolve the pollution cases of the 1960s and 1970s,
suggested that the Japanese State encouraged mediation and conciliation as a
means to control disputes.28 Professor Tanase analyzed automobile accident
19

John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES 359, 366-367 (1978).
Id. at 368; see also JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX 83 (1994); CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 80-107 (E.J. Brill ed.,
1991). Both discuss extensive litigation during the Ashikaga and Tokugawa periods, as well as the early
Showa era.
21
Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, supra note 19, at 379-80. Professor Haley cites to
bond-posting requirements, filing costs, clogged courts, and a lack of remedies, as discouraging use of
formal process, while the effectiveness of third-party intervention lessens the need. Id. at 378-87.
22
J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict
Rates in Japan, XVIII J. LEGAL. STUD. 263, 267-68 (1989) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Nakazato, The
Rational Litigant Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan].
23
J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH XVII
(1999) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH].
24
Ramseyer & Nakazato, The Rational Litigant Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan,
supra note 22, at 280-81, 289-90. Professor Foote has suggested generalization based on traffic accident
data is “dangerous.” See generally Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and Judicial
Activism in Japan, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 19 (1995). Professor Ramseyer has argued broader applicability. See
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims: The Japanese
Experience, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 621, 656 n. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Ramseyer, The Effect of Universal
Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims].
25
See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 23, at 92-95.
26
See id. Professor Ramseyer points to the absence of juries, a judiciary that prizes uniformity and
applies a national body of law, and judges who signal likely outcomes over discontinuous trial sessions and
use detailed, public formula to calculate damages, as all contributing to settlement of claims. See id.
27
Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 36; Nottage, supra note 1, at 764.
28
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 53-66 (1987). Professor Upham
describes, inter alia, the attempts by local and national governments to force mediation between Chisso
20
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compensation and found management of disputes by the Japanese elite in
order to maintain low levels of litigation and insulate the government from
challenge.29
More recently, Professors Ginsburg and Hoetker reviewed these
theories in light of statistics showing a “stark” increase in litigation in the
1990s. 30 They found the increase attributable to procedural reforms, the
expansion of the Japanese judiciary and bar, and economic change following
the collapse of Japan’s economic bubble. 31 In other words, culture and
predictability did not change; the economy and the institutional incapacity
cited by Professor Haley did. Easier access to the courts and economic bad
times account for the stark increase in litigation.
What all of this misses, at least in describing the Japan of today, is
evidence suggesting that Professor Kawashima’s traditional world of weak
rights and ambiguous norms still exists; but it co-exists with a complex,
almost hyper-legal society. Shifting the focus from culture to rights suggests
there are layers of the law in Japan. The layers start with formal ordering
that precisely defines rights and duties on an individual level: residential
leases address minutiae, and volumes of public regulation detail when a
nuclear power plant may operate. 32 Secondary ordering, however,
circumscribes that formal order. It does so by incorporating traditional
notions of equity, Professor Kawashima’s rights that “exist but don’t exist.”
Judicial decisions rewrite leases based on fairness and current economic
circumstances, and operating decisions for nuclear power plants are based on
local consensus. 33 Vaguely defined norms still exist, and are often
dispositive, but they come into play after navigating detailed legal norms.
Concrete norms define the territory, but, if challenged, they often give way
to vague norms that define an equitable outcome. 34 As a result, negotiation
occurs not in the shadow of the law, but in the shadow of private ordering
Corporation and those poisoned by the mercury it discharged into Minamata Bay. Id. After failed
mediation and adverse court decisions, the national government established new compensation funds and
new mediation and conciliation bodies to review environmental pollution cases, again removing the bulk of
those cases from the court system. Id.
29
Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 656-57 (1990). According to Professor Tanase, the Japanese State controls
demand for formal legal process without coercion by limiting its efficiency so that state-supported and
private alternative dispute resolution becomes more attractive. Id.
30
See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 25-27. Statistics cited by Professors Ginsburg and
Hoetker show a spike staring in 1992. Id at 35. Japan’s economic bubble burst in 1991. See Sekai no
Shuyou Kabushiki Shijou, ASAHI SHINBUM CHOKAN, Oct. 8, 1996, at 13.
31
See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 25-27.
32
See infra Parts II.B. & IV.A.
33
See infra Parts II.C. & IV.B.
34
See infra Parts II-IV.
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based on a detailed enumeration of rights. When that negotiation fails,
appeals to vague rights, notions of fairness, and the “consensus of society”
follow.
The remainder of the article will support this discussion with
specifics. Parts II and III examine private law issues: contract law and
practice, followed by employment law and practice. Part IV will address a
public law subject, environmental law, and focus specifically on the
regulation of nuclear power. These subjects are addressed here for two
reasons: first, each subject has seen significant development in the law that
warrants discussion; second, they collectively illustrate the layering of legal
norms in Japan. For each section, the discussion begins with a review of the
transactional documents or public regulation that initially defines rights and
obligations. An examination of secondary ordering in the courts of law or
public consensus follows. The conclusion then briefly discusses other
examples, including recent attempts to use contract law to deter crime.
From contracts to crime, whether one examines private law or public law,
one finds that Japan is a country now governed by layers of the law.
II.

CONTRACT LAW & PRACTICE IN JAPAN

In thinking about contracting practice in Japan, Professor Kawashima
again provides the starting point. He suggests that oral agreements are
common, and “even when written agreements are drafted their contents are
generally very simple:”35
When we compare this situation with the situation in European
and American business transactions . . . where contractual rights
and duties are set forth in detail “to the point of being
permeated with minutiae” that provides for every possible
contingency and where contracts are often printed in their full
particulars in letters that are so small that one cannot read them
without a magnifying glass, we can understand the very
conspicuous Japanese peculiarity in this regard.36
In Japan, Professor Kawashima observed “a tendency to avoid clarity and
legally enforceable rights and duties with a concomitant desire to maintain
flexibility in light of supervening events.” 37 His comments have been
35

Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 15

(1974).
36

Id.
John O. Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice and Law in Japan, 1 J. EAST ASIA AND INT’L L. 47,
50 (2008).
37
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echoed by some and challenged by others. 38 Some practitioners have
suggested that the Japanese are much more likely than U.S. parties to rely on
oral agreements, and when there is a written agreement, it tends to be less
detailed.39 Professors Uchida and Taylor state that an “axiomatic feature of
‘Japanese contracts’ prior to the 1990s was the brevity and perfunctory
language of contract documentation.”40
Others have suggested that there is little difference between Japanese
and Western contracting practice. According to Professor Ramseyer, “[l]ike
Jason and Freddie Krueger,” stereotypes about Japanese contracting practice
“just will not die. Unfortunately, even if not dead, most are dead wrong.”41
Professor Ramseyer argues that the Japanese negotiate and write extensive
contracts, and their contracts are not necessarily vague or necessarily short.42
With professional judges and fewer choice of law issues, one might expect
less specificity on the margins. 43 But parties to repeat deals in Japan do
specify the important terms. Automobile manufacturers and suppliers will
sign a “basic contract,” but this is followed by a host of documents
specifying production schedules and the like.44 Professor Ramseyer argues
that a two-tiered contracting scheme explains both the U.S. and Japan: so
long as the relationship continues, the parties structure their interaction by
non-binding terms; however, all relationships end, so they also draft parallel,
legally-enforceable contracts that govern the terms of their end game.45
38

See, e.g., Young et al., Japanese Attitudes Towards Contracts: An Empirical Wrinkle in the
Debate, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 789, 792 (2003).
39
See Evidence of Distinct Attitudes in Typical US and Japanese Contracts, in LAW AND
INVESTMENT IN JAPAN 280-81 (Yanagida et al. eds. 2000); Carl J. Green, Japan: “The Rule of Law Without
Lawyer” Reconsidered, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND
COMMENTARY 179, 181-182 (2d ed. 2012).
40
Takashi Uchida & Veronica L. Taylor, Japan’s “Era of Contract,” in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING
POINT 472 (Daniel E. Foote ed., 2007). Professor Foote explains this brevity in terms of “relational
contracts.” See Daniel E. Foote, Evolution in the Concept of Contracts, reprinted in LAW AND INVESTMENT
IN JAPAN 293-98 (Yanagida et al. eds., 2000). Attitudes towards contracts depend on the nature and
duration of the relationship of the parties. Id. at 468. Japanese companies seek to develop a long-term
stable relationship based on trust, and those long-term relationships obviate the need for long, extensive
contracts. Id. Cross-shareholding between companies magnifies this trend, resulting in less need for
detailed, specific contracts. Id. Companies operating outside of the cross-sharing holding relationship face
reputational risk–the risk of alienating one company and burning several bridges, which again alleviates the
need for complex contracts. Id. In comparison, Japanese companies are willing to, and do, demand
complex, detailed contracts with foreign companies–those with whom they do not have a relationship, and
who are not subject to the same kind of reputational risk. See id. at 468; KENNETH PORT & GERALD
MCALINN, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 458 (2003).
41
RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 23, at 61.
42
Id. at 62.
43
See id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 65. To prevent opportunistic behavior during the relationship, they rely on future profits and
reputation. See id.
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A review of contracts obtained over the past several years suggests an
element of truth in all of this discourse. 46 Some contracts remain
deceptively simple, providing no more than a bare-bones structure for the
relationship. Some contracts are remarkably detailed, “permeated with
minutiae,” literally requiring a magnifying glass to read. A review of both
the contracts and recent case law suggests a two-tiered contracting scheme,
but one different from that suggested by Professor Ramseyer. The first tier
is detailed and based on the specific terms of the contract. When
relationships end and the courts are involved, however, different norms
apply: not the detailed norms of the contract, but the vague norms of the
court applying its own conception of equity.
This section examines language from recent contracts: first those
categorized here as “traditional” contracts because of their continued use of
vaguely defined rights and obligations; and then those characterized as
“modern” contracts because they define rights in remarkable detail. A
discussion of the courts’ re-interpretation of contracts in recent cases
follows.
“Traditional Contracts”

A.

What Professor Kawashima would likely consider "traditional"
contracts are still used today. They cover only the most basic terms and
leave a lot to the imagination. One professionally prepared contract
template for purchasing real property covers a little over a page and simply
identifies the parties, price, earnest money, delivery, parcel to be delivered,
costs of recording, risk of loss prior to delivery, and a right to terminate on
breach of contract.47 Breach is not defined, no contingencies are covered,
and there is no discussion of the method of payment or financing.48 There is
no discussion of representations or disclosures; no discussion of inspections
or access; no discussion of warranties, tax, or survey information.49
One still sees traditional contracts for services, covering only the most
basic terms, and intentionally incorporating ambiguity. Parties will define
basic obligations and the price, and then state that “with regard to
compensation, where there are changes in the requested services established
. . . or other change in circumstances, the parties . . . may, on consultation,
46

The contracts were obtained from practitioners in Tokyo, consulting firms, and practice manuals.
They include contracts for goods and services, lease agreements, employment contracts, and contracts for
the sale of real property, used by companies ranging in size from small and medium-sized to multi-national.
47
Contract on file with author (Sept. 6, 2005), arts. 1-11.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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change the compensation terms.”50 Leases often include similar language,
stating that the parties may demand a change in rent during the contract term
when it has become “inappropriate” (fusōtō) because of “an increase or
decrease in taxes assessed on the land or building;” “an increase or decrease
in the value of the land or building or other change in economic conditions;”
or the rent has become unreasonable “when compared to rents charged for
comparable buildings nearby.”51
Leases often include vague statements prohibiting tenants from
engaging in acts which “cause inconvenience” (meiwaku) to neighboring
tenants or property holders, violation of which, at least on their face, provide
grounds for terminating the contract. 52 Contracts often include vague
statements regarding compliance with the law53 and inevitably end with a
general meet and confer provision: the parties “will consult in good faith to
devise a resolution when events not covered in this contract arise or when a
conflict arises as to the interpretation or execution of this contract.”54
B.

Modern Contracts

These contracts stand in sharp contrast to others used today—
contracts that Professor Kawashima would describe as “permeated with
minutiae that provides for every possible contingency.” 55 In contrast to the
bare-bones real estate contract referenced above, a residential lease now
used by a large property management company in Tokyo contains pages
assigning rights and liabilities for every contingency imaginable, including,
for example, terms covering renters’ liability for damages, lessor’s
disclaimers of liability, “prohibited acts,” early termination of the lease,
termination prior to occupancy, conditions which void the contract, separate
50

Contract on file with author (July 1, 2008), art. 2.
Contract on file with author (Mar. 15, 2012), art. 4(3) (1-3). These clauses are based, in part, on
the Doctrine of Changed Circumstances, which provides that “a contract party has the right to require an
adjustment of the terms of the agreement or, if no mutual compromise can be reached, to rescind the
contract where (1) there has been a change of circumstances, that (2) has occurred after the contract was
concluded but prior to the time for performance, (3) could not have been foreseen by the parties, (4) is not
attributable to the fault of either party, and (5) renders performance under the terms of the contract
unconscionable.” See Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice and Law in Japan, supra note 37, at 61. These
provisions were regularly invoked after March 11, 2011. Interview with property manager (Tokyo 2012).
Notes on file with author.
52
Contract on file with author (May 15, 2012), art. 10(2).
53
Contract on file with author (July 1, 2008), art. 8.
54
Contract on file with author. Other language commonly used states, “[w]here no term is
established in this contract, or where there is doubt regarding the interpretation of terms in this contract,
[the parties] will confer in good faith and seek to resolve the issue smoothly.” Contract on file with author
(July 1, 2008), art. 8.
55
Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, supra note 35, at 15.
51
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conditions for terminating the contract and surrendering the premises, and
terms incorporating by reference other terms.56
The level of detail is best illustrated by what follows the enumerated
terms: extensive charts incorporated by reference, including one that details
the lessee’s responsibility to repair or replace. 57 One section specifically
enumerates liability for things like damage to shower hoses, rubber stoppers,
and toilet paper holders. Separate sections address common areas and
include provisions for burnt out light bulbs; entrance areas, and damage to
the door peephole; the kitchen; living room; electric fixtures; water and
waste systems; and liability for items like damaged telephone jacks and
towel racks.58
Separate charts follow this one apportioning liability based on length
of occupancy. For occupancy under three months, the lessor is one-hundred
percent responsible for repairing or replacing the window screens; after three
months, the lessor is fifty percent responsible. For occupancy under three
months, the lessor is one-hundred percent responsible for repairing or
replacing the shower hose; after that it is responsible for fifty percent of the
costs.59
In addition to the lease, there is a separate “Explanation of Important
Terms” enumerating fifty-two important items, some different from the
lease. This is followed by a separate “Explanatory Document Based on the
Ordinance for the Prevention of Disputes Relating to Leasing Residences,”
which repeats the terms and charts apportioning liability when vacating the
property. 60 The result is a residential lease document, spanning a dozen
pages in tiny font, attempting to apportion liability down to the light bulbs
and toilet paper holders.
This focus on defining rights and obligations is found elsewhere.
Leases have long required that a personal guarantor assume joint and several

56

Contract on file with author (Sept. 21, 2011) at arts. 11, 14-22. Additional terms cover subleases;
the term of the lease; permissible uses for the property; renewal of the lease; refusal to renew; rent and
management fees; late payment; deposits; assignment of charges for utilities, taxes, and the like;
assignment of costs for repairs; renters’ liability for damages, lessor’s disclaimer of liability, and renter’s
insurance requirements; lessor’s right of entry; lessor’s abandonment of lease; terms for terminating the
contract; terms for surrendering the premises terms for joint guarantors; required notices to lessor; required
compliance with separate terms of use incorporated by reference; choice of jurisdiction; terms regarding
return of “key money;” special terms for when corporate entities act as lessees; terms governing use of
parking spaces and a separate subset of enumerated “special provisions” governing everything from use of
personal information to relationships with organized crime. Id. at 1-10, 12-13, 23-27.
57
Id. at Annexed Table (Beppyō) Nos. 1-3.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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liability for the payment of any debts.61 Some now require guarantors to
consent to notarized contracts, so that lessors can collect on debts without
fully litigating the dispute.62 Lessees must agree to provide the necessary
information to create the notarized document, and shoulder half the cost to
do so.63
The same trend towards complexity and strict apportionment of
liability is not found just in property contracts. A recent service contract
provides an example. At the request of its auditor, a service provider for
small to medium-sized businesses renegotiated all of its contracts in order to
insert disclaimers of liability and additional confidentiality requirements.
The contract still includes standard terms identifying the parties, the purpose
of the contract, the services provided, and the like,64 but it also now requires
the buyer to assume liability for any and all acts of its employees, whether
done privately or in the scope of employment. 65 For some services, the
provider warrants best efforts but now disclaims “any and all legal
responsibility.”66 For other services, the provider explicitly limits its liability
to damage caused by intentional acts or gross negligence, and limits
remedies to specifically exclude consequential damages.67 The contract now
contains extensive confidentiality provisions, covering even the existence of
the contract,68 as well as requirements for handling personal information.69
Confidentiality requirements are now regularly the subject of separate
addenda to contracts, regardless of the nature of the services. 70 Contract
61

See, e.g., SHŌJI SHINOZUKA, SHINBAN SHAKUCHI/SHAKUYA NO KISO 134 (1984); Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Minkan Chintai Jūtaku wo Meguru Genjō to Kadai (Feb. 24,
2009), available at http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000034783.pdf; Charles Lewis, Renter guarantee
system
a
headache for foreigners, THE JAPAN TIMES Apr. 23, 2013, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/comm
unity/2013/04/23/issues/renter-guarantor-system-a-headache-for-foreigners/#.UXW1ArWG3pU.
62
Contract on file with author (May 15, 2012), art. 26. Notarization in Japan establishes
documentary and substantive authenticity. A notarized contractual obligation for the repayment of money
allows its holder to move directly to the enforcement state of the proceedings in court. See Michael K.
Young & Constance Hamilton, The Legal Profession, in JAPAN BUSINESS LAW GUIDE, ch. 7, ¶7-900
(Mitsuo Matsushita ed., CCH Australia Ltd. 1988), reprinted in CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY 46, 54 (2006). For an exhaustive study of civil law
notaries, particularly those in Latin America, see Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: The Latin
Notary, A Historical and Comparative Model, 19 HASTINGS INT’L L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (1995-1996).
63
Contract on file with author (May 15, 2012), art. 26.
64
Contract on file with author (Sept. 14, 2011). arts. 1-19. The stated terms address assignment
rights, the timing and method of payment, conditions for termination, choice of laws, and an agreement to
meet and confer in good faith to resolve disputes relating to the contract. Id.
65
Id. at art. 7.
66
Id. at art. 10.
67
Id. at art. 14.
68
Id. at art. 8.
69
Id. at art. 9.
70
Contract on file with author (Nov. 29, 2011).
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addenda will set forth detailed requirements for when a service provider
enters a purchaser’s facilities. Pages will detail “information management”
requirements, including appointment of “contract managers” and
“information management supervisors.” 71 They will require signed
confidentiality pledges, and agreements to on-site inspection of computer
systems and facilities, with or without notice.72
These contracts reflect, in part, increased complexity in the law. The
confidentiality requirements are, in part, attempts to comply with Japan’s
Personal Information Protection Act and the Electronic Communications
Enterprise Act. 73 They also reflect increased concern about liability—
defining it, disclaiming it, and limiting remedies. This concern is part of a
larger shift, advocated by the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) in
2001, from a society based on “preemptive administrative regulation to one
based upon ex post facto oversight and remedies [and] personal
responsibility.” 74 The end result, while not uniform, is primary ordering
based on increasingly detailed, complex contracts.
C.

Courts and Contracts

Regardless of the detail in the contract, when contested, Japanese
courts often revise them. 75 They have a long history of doing so, and
scholars have translated representative decisions.76 What is remarkable is
71

Id. at art. 3.
Id. at art. 6.
73
See generally Kojin Jōhō no Hogo ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Personal Information Protection Act],
Law No. 57, 2003 Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi
(last visited May 14, 2013); Denki Tsuushin Jigyō Hō [Electric Communications Enterprises Law] Law No.
86, 1984 Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (last visited
May 14, 2013).
74
See Uchida & Taylor, supra note 40, at 457, excerpting, and more succinctly translating, portions
of the JSRC report, available in its entirety in Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council–For
a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21 st Century, 2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119,
127.
75
Japanese courts modify contracts based on public policy, public welfare, good faith, or an abuse of
rights, “depending on the context of the particular relationship.” Trevor Ryan, The Trust in an Ageing
Japan: Has Commercialization Precluded the Trust from Reaching its Welfare Potential?, 7 ASIAN J.
COMP. LAW 10 (2012).
76
In 1912, a Tokyo court found that the parties “lacked any intent” to be bound by certain portions
of the written lease, and voided notice to terminate based on it. A 1982 Osaka court evaluated the
termination clause in a written lease by looking at the parties’ relative need for the property finding that
there were “reasonable grounds” to enforce the contract if the lessor also paid the lessee his moving
expenses. See Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] July 3, 1912, 804 Hōritsu Shinbun 24, trans. by J. Mark
Ramseyer reprinted in MILHAPUT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND
COMMENTARY supra note 62, at 394-96; Osaka Chisai [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Apr. 28, 1982, 476 Hanrei
Taimuzu 130 trans. by J. Mark Ramseyer reprinted in Milhaput et al., supra note 62, at 395-396. Scholars
suggest the housing shortages in the 1950s prompted the courts to weigh the relative needs of the lessor and
lessee for the property, with greater concern for the lessee. Nobuhisa Segawa, Fudousan no Chintaishaku–
72
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that courts continue to blue-line contracts, to re-write their terms, and, in
some instances, to create new ones out of whole cloth. As the parties define
their rights and obligations in ever-greater detail, the courts continue to
revise them, based on vague notions of fairness. A recent example,
discussed next, comes from a series of Supreme Court cases handed down
over this past decade dealing with claims brought by sophisticated business
entities, often major real estate developers, to lower contractually-mandated
rent.
1.

Sublease Cases

In traditional Japan, regardless of the lease, a lessor was expected, as a
favor, to reduce the rent following a bad harvest, death in the family, or other
exceptional hardship. 77 The lessee, in turn, was expected to provide
additional labor or other return of the favor granted.78 Articles 11 and 32 of
the Land and Building Lease Act turned that favor into a legal right.79
Article 11 states that if rent for land becomes “unreasonable” as a
result of changes in taxes, land prices, or the rent departs from comparable
rents for similar properties in the vicinity, the parties may request a rent
increase or decrease.80 They may do so regardless of the contract terms, and
if the parties can’t agree on the increase or decrease, the renter may pay an
amount it deems reasonable, pending judgment by the court. If the court
finds that amount insufficient, the lessee must pay the difference, with
interest.81 The same statutory framework exists, pursuant to Article 32, for
adjustment of rent for building space.82
During Japan’s economic bubble, land developers approached
landowners with grand plans. 83 The plans, and contracts based on them,
Sono Gendai teki Kadai, at 3, in Fudōsan no Chintaishaku no Kadai to Tenbō (Matsuo & Yamano eds.,
2012). The 1960s and greater housing stocks saw development of eviction fees and other monetary
remedies considered sufficient to create reasonable grounds for eviction. Id. Not limited to leases, a 1970
Nagoya High court reviewed a recording contract, revising it because of “excessive profiteering.” Nagoya
Chisai [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Jan. 30, 1970, Hanrei Taikei 27403456, trans. by J. Mark Ramseyer reprinted in
Milhaput et al., supra note 62, at 307.
77
See KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 22-29.
78
Id.
79
Shakuchi Shakuya Hō [Land and Building Lease Act], Law No. 90 of 1991, translated in Ministry
of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1
&re=02&dn=1&x=68&y=19&co=01&ky=land+and+building+lease+act&page=4.
80
Id. at art. 11. A statutory exception excludes requests where the contract provides a fixed term
during which rent shall not be increased. Id.
81
Id. at art. 11(2) & (3).
82
Id. at art. 23.
83
Tokuhō Kaisetsu [News Alert Commentary], 1140 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 68 (Mar. 15, 2004);
Segawa, supra note 76, at 5.
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generally provided for the landowner to build the building(s) to an agreed
design and the developer to rent them in their entirety and then sublease
space to individual renters.84 The master leases generally established a fixed
rent for the building, with riders providing for automatic rent increases
during the term of the contract. 85 Based on these plans and estimated
revenue streams, the property owners financed construction of the
building(s). 86 After the collapse of the bubble and real estate market,
developers asked for reduced rent, landowners refused, and litigation
followed.87 Developers sought “confirmation” of reduced rent payable on
the master lease, and sometimes refund of “excess rent paid;” landowners
sought payment of unpaid rent.88
Following a split in the lower courts,89 in 2003, the Supreme Court
issued its first opinion applying Article 32 to these sublease contracts.90 In
1986, Mitsui Fudosan, one of the largest real estate developers in Japan,
approached a corporate landowner in Tokyo and agreed to rent all of the
space in a proposed building for a period of fifteen years, for ¥1.9 billion per
annum.91 The contract provided for a ten percent rent increase every three
years during the lease. 92 Based on this, the property owner obtained
financing for construction, and, with construction complete, the first tenants
moved in in 1991.93 The real estate market collapsed shortly thereafter: by
1994, market values were fifty percent of the agreed rent; by 1997, they
were thirty-five percent.
Mitsui Fudosan repeatedly requested rent
reductions for the building; the owner refused; and Mitsui Fudosan
unilaterally reduced its rent payments. The owner then filed suit.94
The district court held that Article 32 did not apply and required
payment of the contractually-mandated rent. 95 The high court held that
Article 32 did apply, but the contract was, in essence, an outsourcing
84

Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 88, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5.
Id. at 68-71.
86
Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 83, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5.
87
Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 83, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5.
88
Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 83, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5.
89
See, e.g., Tokyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Jan. 25, 2000, Hei 10 (ne) no. 3894, 1020
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 157 (applying Art. 32 on a limited basis); Tokyo Kousai [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct.
27, 1999, Hei 10 (ne) no. 5145, 1017 TAIMUZU [HANTA] 278 (affirming application of Art. 32). Tokyo
Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 5, 2002, Hei 13 (ne) no. 4033, 1087 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 280
(rejecting application of Art. 32).
90
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct] Oct. 21, 2003 Hei 12 (uke) no. 573, Hei 12 (uke) no. 574, 1140 HANREI
TAIMZU [HANTA] 68.
91
Id. at 68.
92
Id. at 69.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 69.
85
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contract rather than a simple lease and Article 32 should be applied to reduce
the rent only to the initially agreed level.96 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the contract was clearly a lease contract, to which Article 32
applied without waiver or limitation.97 As a result, when reviewing requests
for rent reduction, courts “should review in its totality the circumstances
giving rise to the lessor and lessee’s decision in fixing the amount of rent as
well as other circumstances.”98
The Supreme Court expounded on this “totality of the circumstances”
standard in subsequent cases. Part of the debate related to proper
characterization of the contracts. Some courts argued that property
developers and management companies working with property owners to
develop a property undertake a “joint venture” rather than simply lease
building space, and Article 32 should not apply. 99 Others argued that with
“order-made” buildings, where an owner builds to a lessee’s specifications
and the building cannot readily be used for other purposes, the contracts
function more like “outsourcing contracts,” and Article 32 should not
apply.100 The Supreme Court rejected both arguments, and in those cases
strictly applied Article 32 and re-wrote the leases.101
Other courts have held that demands for rent reduction should be
recognized only in special circumstances where the terms of the contract
have “lost fairness and violate good faith.” 102 When an appellate court
applied that standard finding that the corporate lessee was not suffering from
financial difficulty, there had been no change in public assessments, and,
hence, no special circumstances supporting reduction, the Supreme Court
reversed.103 It found error in considering only the lessee’s overall financial

96

Id.
Id. at 70, 73.
98
Id. at 70, 73. This totality of the circumstances review requires consideration of (a) the process
by which the rent terms were decided and their relationship to the market price for rent for other similar
properties; (b) the anticipated income and expenditures for the defendant in subleasing the property,
including the parties’ awareness regarding anticipated changes in occupancy at different rent levels; and (c)
the plaintiff’s anticipated receipt of key money and requirements for repayment of any financing. Id.
99
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Mar. 10, 2005, Hei 14 no. 1954, 1179 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 185,
186.
100
Id. at 186.
101
Id. at 186. See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct. 21, 2003, Hei 13 (uke) no. 573, 1149 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 68; Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct. 23, 2003, Oct. 23, 2003 Hei 14 (uke) no. 852, 1140
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 79; Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Nov. 8, 2004, Hei 15 (uke) no. 869, 1173
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 192.
102
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Mar. 10, 2005 Hei 14 (uke) no. 1954, 1179 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]
185.
103
Id. at 185-86.
97
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condition and land assessments when “[a]ll of the circumstances should be
comprehensively considered.”104
Part of the debate revolved around the scope of Article 32. In a 2003
opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the rent and automatic
increases were significant factors in signing the contract at issue.105 As a
result, “the point of view of fairness” required consideration of these terms
even if they weren’t binding, and precluded application of Article 32 to rent
paid prior to occupancy of the building.106 In a 2008 decision, the Supreme
Court reviewed multiple demands for rent reduction and determined what
changes in circumstances would be considered when. 107 The rationale
provided explains the court’s focus. The Supreme Court found that the
automatic rent increases were based on the parties’ “predictions about future
economic circumstances” and not based on an agreement at the point of the
increase about what constituted reasonable rent “based on actual economic
conditions.”108 To rectify that, the courts substitute their analyses based on
current economic conditions for the parties’ earlier predictions about the
future.
In a 2003 decision, the Supreme Court upheld a claim for rent
reduction, despite the parties’ entry into a lease and a separate
“confirmation” agreement guaranteeing the rent.109 In order to convince the
property owner to build, the real estate development company had
specifically guaranteed above market rents in two separate documents. 110
The high court enforced the terms of the contract, and the Supreme Court
reversed.111 The Tokyo High Court’s decision on remand is notable because
of its fact-specific analysis.112
The high court found that the owner had relied on the rent
confirmation in entering into the joint venture, taking out the loans, and
104
105

Id. at 186-88.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct. 21, 2003 Hei 12 (uke) no. 123, 1140 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]

75, 78.
106

Id.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Feb. 29, 2008 Hei 18 (uke) no. 192, 1267 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]
161. Only changes in circumstances between the initial contract and the first request for reduction are
considered initially. For later demands, if the court upholds the first request for reduction, it considers the
date of the later request as the starting point for determining economic change. If the court rejects the first
request, the starting point would default to the original contract date. Id.
108
Id.
109
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] October 23, 2003 Hei 14 (uke) no. 852, 1140 HANREI TAIMUZU
[HANTA] 79.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 80, 81.
112
Tokyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Dec. 22, 2004, Hei 15 (ne) no. 5399, 1170 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 122, 123, 127.
107
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investing in the project.113 But it found “a significant change in economic
circumstances” and, in comparison with surrounding rents, that the
guaranteed rent had become “unreasonable” (fusōtō na mono).114 The court
then examined in detail the owner’s anticipated income, repayment plan, and
the decrease in taxes and interest rates. It found that “from the perspective
of fairness,” the rent should be reduced regardless of the guarantee, to the
extent doing so would not jeopardize the loan repayments. 115 The court
examined the parties’ negotiation efforts, and based on “consideration of all
the circumstances in their totality,” decided on a “reasonable” amount that
was approximately ten percent less than the contracted rent for the initial
period.116
This type of fact-sensitive analysis in determining “reasonable” rent,
regardless of the contract, is standard. In a 2004 decision, the Supreme
Court found that a large real estate developer had approached a textile
manufacturer about redeveloping land.117 The parties entered into a lease
providing for fixed rent with five percent bi-annual increases.118 After the
manufacturer razed a closed factory and constructed the planned buildings,
the developer sought decreases in the rent and demanded return of “excess
rent” paid.119 The high court found, inter alia, that the express terms of the
contract prohibited rent reduction below the contracted amount, and those
terms were “an absolute condition” for the landowner to develop the
property. 120 The court noted, however, the remarkable economic changes
occurring following collapse of the bubble and invalidated two of the rent
increases.121
The Supreme Court reversed, finding this remedy too limited. The
concurring and dissenting opinions bookend the debate. 122 The dissent
argued that the history of the Act makes clear that it was intended to protect
“socially weaker parties,” i.e. residential tenants, and this was a joint venture
between sophisticated parties.123 According to the dissent, the Act’s purpose
113

Tokyo High Ct Dec. 22, 2004, supra note 119, at 122, 123, 127.
Id. at 123, 128. The court found that the actual rental income for the building was approximately
half that expected. The court noted that the owner’s property taxes had decreased by a third, and the
interest rates paid on the construction loans were variable and falling. Id.
115
Id. at 123, 128.
116
Id. at 123.
117
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Nov. 8, 2004, (uke) no. 869, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 192.
118
Id. at 192.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 192.
121
Id. at 192.
122
Id. at 193.
123
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Nov. 8, 2004, (uke) no. 869, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA], supra
note 117 at 193, 197.
114
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was not to reassign profits between sophisticated parties; “freedom of
contract” should prevail.124 The concurring opinion focused on “fairness,”
as opposed to freedom of contract.125 In this case, because the interest due
on the construction loans had decreased, it was “fair” to decrease the rent as
well.126 To allow only the lessor to benefit from the unforeseeably large
drop in interest rates, when those interest rates formed the basis for
determining rent under the contract, “lacks fairness.”127
Other decisions have applied this type of analysis to direct leases for
“order-made” buildings and standard leases for common building space.128
The Supreme Court has applied this analysis to cases involving leases of
land. 129 Whether it is a contract for the lease of land or a building, a
sublease or a direct lease, the focus in the courts is on substantive fairness in
light of current, as opposed to anticipated, conditions.130 In doing so, the
courts redefine the relationship. The parties clearly assign risks and
liabilities in their contracts and “confirmation agreements.” The courts
revise those assignments. When the courts elect to apply Article 32 instead
of enforcing the terms of the contract, clear divisions of rights and
responsibilities give way to notions of equity and “fairness.”
2.

Lease Renewal & Other Cases

These cases are not an anomaly. The courts have recently engaged in
substantive review of clearly designated contractual terms in reviewing
“renewal fees” for leases.131 They have done the same for supply contracts
and insurance agreements.132 In each of these areas, recent Supreme Court

124

Id. at 197.
Id. at 196.
126
Id. at 193. The concurring opinion focused on “the original intent of the contract,” suggesting that
“not only the cost of the building and the rents charged for similar, proximately located buildings, but also
the method for servicing debt on the property is a foremost consideration in establishing the rent term,”
such that if interest rates fall the rent should as well. Id. at 196.
127
Id. at 197.
128
See Segawa, supra note 76, at 6-7.
129
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] June 12, 2003, Hei 14 (uke) no. 689, 1126 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]
106.
130
Some scholars have suggested that courts are preserving relationships, i.e. the courts treat the
parties as partners in a partnership that cannot readily be terminated because of a poor economic climate or
other circumstances. The courts craft a judicial resolution with this in mind, engaging in small-scale debt
restructuring, prior to significant economic disruption. See Segawa, supra note 76, at 7-8.
131
See, e.g., Takagi Harumichi, Hanrei Kenkyū Iinkai Heisei 23 Nen Kōshinryō Hanrei Kenkyū no
Hōkokushō, TOKYO SHIHŌ SHŌSHIKAI SAMTAMA SHIKAI, available at http://www.3tama.org/kenshu/hanrei
3.htm.
132
See Tooru Kamiyama, Keizoku teki Baibai Keiyaku ni Kan suru Hito Kōsatsu, 5 HOKUDAI
HŌGAKU KENKYŪKA [JUNIOR RESEARCH JOURNAL] 1, 3 (Nov. 1998); Shindo & Nakajima, Chūshaku §§
125
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decisions rein in dramatic departures from the terms of the contract, but the
starting point is the same. It expressly involves consideration of the equities.
With regard to lease renewals, practices vary by region but lessors,
pursuant to the contract, commonly assess a renewal fee at the end of the
lease term if a lease is renewed.133 The renewal fees can be substantial, the
equivalent of one to two months’ rent, though amounts are sometimes
negotiable. They are also subject to challenge.134
While challenges to renewal fees began as early as the 1960s, the
1996 revisions to the small claims provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure
and the 2000 passage of Japan’s Consumer Contract Act accelerated these
claims. 135 And the courts have started invalidating renewal fees. 136 In a
2009 decision, the Osaka High Court invalidated renewal fees in a one-year
lease that required key money of ¥60,000, monthly rent of ¥45,000, and a
lease renewal fee of ¥100,000.137 The court found this renewal fee, imposed
every year, violated the Civil Code’s Article 1(2) good faith requirement as
incorporated into the Consumer Contract Act.138 The renewal fee did not
function as consideration and imposed an excess burden on the lessee
beyond that provided for in the Civil Code.139 It “lacked a rational basis”
given the difference in information available to the lessor and lessee; 140 the
Land and Building Lease Act limitations on the lessor’s ability to terminate
the lease; 141 and the significant economic burden the fee imposed on the
lessor.142
537-539 Daishansha no Tame no Keiyaku, SHINPAN CHŪSHAKU MINPŌ (13) SAIKEN (4) 776 (Igarashi
Kiyoshi & Taniguchi Kohei eds.) (2006).
133
Id.
134
See Segawa, supra note 76, at 11-12.
135
See id.
136
Kōshinryō Saibanrei no Shōsai Hikaku, TŌKYŌ SHIHŌ SHŌSHIKAI SANTAMA SHIKAI (December
2010), available at www.3tama.org/kenshu/hanrei/koushinryou2.pdf (last visited July 2, 2012).
137
Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct] Aug. 27, 2009 Hei 20 (ne) nos. 474, 1023, 2062 HANREI
JIHŌ 40.
138
Article 10 of the Consumer Contract Act nullifies contract clauses that “impair the interests of
consumers one-sidedly.” More specifically, contract clauses that (a) restrict consumer rights or impose
duties on consumers beyond that provided in default provisions the Civil and Commercial Codes and (b)
that “impair the interests of consumers” in a manner that violates the good faith provision of the Civil Code
are deemed to be void. Shōhisha Keiyaku Hō [Consumer Contract Act], Law No. 61 of 2000, art. 10,
translated in Ministry of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation
.go.jp http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
139
Article 601 of the Civil Code provides: “A lease shall become effective when one of the parties
promises to make a certain thing available for the using and taking the profits by the other party and the
other party promises to pay rent for the same.” Minpō [Minpō] [Civ. C.] art. 601, translated in Ministry of
Justice, Japanese Law Translation, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
140
Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct] Aug. 27, 2009, supra note 138.
141
The court is referring to Article 28, which sets out “Requirements for Refusing to Renew a
Building Lease Contract” and states that notice of termination requires a showing, based on the parties
relationship, the conditions of the building, and offers of compensation, “that there are justifiable grounds
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Subsequent courts split on the issue, 143 and the Supreme Court
weighed in by reviewing three renewal fee cases in 2011. 144 The court
upheld each renewal fee, finding the Consumer Contract Act applicable but
not violated.145 The Supreme Court found that the renewal fees functioned
as either prepayment or supplemental rent, and that they had a “rational
economic basis.” 146 The court held “an unambiguous and concretely
enumerated renewal clause in a lease contract will not constitute contractual
language which ‘impairs the interests of consumers unilaterally against the
fundamental principle provided in Civil Code Article 1(2),’” so long as there
are no “special circumstances suggesting, inter alia, that the amount of the
renewal fee is too high in light of such factors as the renewal term of the
lease contract.”147 Lower courts are now determining whether renewal fees
are “too high,” and in some cases still voiding the plain language of the
contract. 148 The result is that the contractual term does not necessarily
define rights. It provides the starting point for an analysis based on
fairness.149
The focus on fairness extends to long-term supply contracts. 150
Professor Haley has written about the judicial treatment of these contracts
and discusses several notable decisions.151 In one, Hokkaido Ford Tractor,
K.K. attempted to terminate a tractor franchise pursuant to the notice and
termination provisions in the contract. 152 The franchisee sued and the
Sapporo High Court, in response, enjoined Ford from selling product to any
for doing so in addition to the circumstances pertaining to the necessity of using the buildings on the part of
the building lessor and the lessee.” Land and Building Lease Act, supra note 79, art. 28.
142
Kōshinryō Saibanrei no Shōsai Hikaku, supra note 136.
143
Id. Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Oct. 29, 2009, Hei 29 (ne) no. 1211, 2064 HANREI
JIHŌ [HANJI] 65; Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Feb. 23, 2010, Hei 21 (ne) no. 2690, 1372
KIN’YŪ SHOUJI HANREI [KINYŪ HANREI]14; Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] May 27, 2010, Hei 21
(ne) no. 2548, Dai-ichi Hōki Hō Jōhō Sōgō Database, Case Id. No. 28161602. A 2009 Kyoto District
Court also found the renewal fees were “a unilateral infringement on consumer benefits,” with no “legally
justifiable grounds.” Contract Renew Fees Violate Tenant Rights, JAPAN TIMES, July 24, 2009.
144
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] July 15, 2011 Hei 22 (o) no. 863, 1361 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 89.
145
Id.
146
The court also found use of renewal fees wide spread and noted that they had not been struck
down previously for violating public policy. Their use was clearly and concretely explained in the contract,
and the disparity between the information and bargaining power of the lessor and lessee not so great as to
demand correction. Id.
147
Id.
148
Kyoto Chihō Saibansho [Kyoto Dist. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2012, Hei 21 (wa) no. 4696, 92 SHŌHISHA NYUSU 257. See, e.g., Harumichi, supra note 132.
149
Scholars have suggested that Article 10 of the Consumer Contract Act is being interpreted more
broadly than the good faith provisions of the Civil Code. Segawa, supra note 76, at 12.
150
Kamiyama, supra note 133, at 3.
151
Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice in Japan, supra note 37, at 64-67.
152
Sapporo Kōtō Saibansho [Sapporo High Ct.] Sept. 30, 1987, Sho 62 (ra) no. 49, 667 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 146-147.
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other dealer in the region for a period of one year.153 While Ford complied
with the terms of the contract, it did not have “unavoidable reasons” to
terminate it.154
The court found that the contract provision providing for yearly
renewal, absent three months advance notice, should be interpreted to mean
that “only where there are unavoidable circumstances requiring ending the
contract is it permitted to give notice” of termination.155 The court reasoned
that because Ford had renewed the annual contract for over fifteen years, and
the retailer had invested in research and incurred labor costs assuming
renewal and without ability to establish a similar franchise, it was
“extremely irrational” to impose on the retailer significant losses while
allowing Ford to profit from the business that the retailer had developed. 156
Courts have defined “unavoidable circumstances” narrowly: “absent
unavoidable circumstances, such as a complete rupture of trust in the
relationship, it is appropriate to find that the contract cannot be terminated or
its renewal refused.” 157 Some courts have improvised notice provisions
where none are found in the contract.158 Some courts have established new
contractual requirements that the purchaser have breached the agreement, or
developed credit problems, or acted in bad faith before termination is
permissible.159
More recent decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court have upheld
termination of long-term supply contracts, leading some to suggest an
increased reluctance to interfere with the contract.160 But, in each case, the
courts upheld the notices to terminate following a clear breach of other terms
of the contract. 161 The starting point for practitioners remains the same:
regardless of the language of the contract, “a Japanese court is likely to
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id. at 146, 148.
156
Id. at 146-47.
157
Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Oct. 25, 1996, Hei 8 (ne) no. 190, 1595 H ANREI
JIHŌ [H ANJI ] 70.
158
See Kamiyama, supra note 133, at 3.
159
Id. Courts offer a number of reasons why they re-write the contracts. They do so most commonly
to protect investments in people and resources and prevent or cushion the blow to the purchaser’s business.
They also cite the need to protect a long-established relationship; to recognize the research or other
business development contributions made by the purchaser to the supplier’s business; to protect the
expectation interests of the retailer or the weaker party to the contract. They re-write the contracts because
termination of contracts are to be the exception and not the rule; because, regardless of the one year
renewable contract term, a one-year term is not economically feasible for the retailer; or to protect the
interests of the down-stream buyer, relying on the retailer and its relationship with the manufacturer. Id. at
10-11. The courts are re-writing contracts based on Japanese notions of equity and protecting relationships.
160
See Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice in Japan, supra note 37, at 65-67.
161
Id.
154
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require ‘justifiable and unavoidable reasons’ in order to allow unilateral
termination” of a “continuous contract.” 162 And the reason remains the
same: regardless of the contract, “the non-terminating party typically will
make business decisions relying on the expected long duration of the
agreement (and Japanese courts believe that such reasonable expectations
should be protected).”163
Japan’s group term life insurance cases show a similar pattern, with
courts—at least the lower courts—revising detailed contracts. Japanese
companies have purchased group term life insurance policies naming the
employees as the insured since the 1930s, but, for decades, administrative
guidance resulted in most policies prohibiting companies from naming
themselves as beneficiaries.164 With deregulation and increased competition
that changed, and that change sparked protest.165 In 1970, a cargo ship sunk
off the coast of Hokkaido and its entire crew perished. 166 The shipping
company received ¥1 million in insurance proceeds per crew member, and
paid ¥100,000 to each surviving family. 167 Public outcry led to new
disclosure and consent requirements. 168 Insurance companies, however,
continued to market the policies as a means to cover employer losses.169 The
policies typically lasted one year and covered all employees, with the
employer paying the entire premium. 170 By the mid-1990s, 79.6% of
companies with over one-thousand employees and 60% of all businesses in
Japan purchased group term policies; 49.7% of them paid nothing to the
survivors of its employees.171
In the mid-1990s, survivors began suing the decedent’s former
employer and the insurance companies, demanding payment of the insurance
proceeds.172 And courts began finding for the plaintiffs.173 They did so on
one of two grounds: (a) they found an implied agreement between the
company and the employee for the company to pay over a significant portion
162

Stephen D. Bohrer & Akio Hoshi, Doing Deals in Japan: An Introductory Guide for U.S.
Practitioners, THE M & A LAWYER (Thomson Reuters), Oct. 2010, at 10.
163
Id.
164
See background discussion in Chihō Saibansho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Mar. 6, 2001, Hei 9 (wa) no.
2716, 1093 HANREI TAIMUZU 228, 232-33.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 233-34.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 235-36.
170
Yuichi Fukushima, Dantai Teiki Hoken Mondai no Genjo to Sono Yukue, at 171 (Koueki Zaidan
Hōjin Seimei Hoken Bunka Senta- Paper), available at www.jili.or.jp (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
171
Id. at 236.
172
Id. at 236.
173
Shindo & Nakajima, supra note 133, at 776-77.
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of the proceeds to the employee’s survivors; or (b) the courts construed the
contract between the insurance provider and the company as a “contract for
the benefit of a third party,” pursuant to Civil Code Section 537. 174 The
plain language of Civil Code requires that the obligor “promise[] in a
contract” that he or she will “tender a certain performance” to a third
party,175 meaning that the courts were implying a term that the Civil Code
otherwise requires be made explicit.
The most significant of these cases involved Sumitomo Light Metal
Industries.176 In 1994, three Sumitomo employees passed away from natural
causes.177 Sumitomo, pursuant to its company work rules and an agreement
with the employee union, paid each of their spouses approximately ¥10
million as a death benefit; 178 insurers, pursuant to life insurance policies
covering these employees, paid Sumitomo approximately ¥183 million.179
The surviving spouses filed suit claiming an express or implied
agreement to pay over all or a substantial portion of the insurance
proceeds.180 Sumitomo contended that the proceeds were intended to fund
corporate pension and welfare funds covering all its employees and there
was no express or implied agreement to pay more than the death benefits
agreed to in the work rules.181
The Nagoya High Court revised the contract, in no uncertain terms. It
held that group term insurance was intended to benefit the employee and a
contracting party diverting these funds to other uses “violated the public
order and morals.”182 It found that the documents that confirmed that “all or
a portion of the insurance proceeds would be used to pay survivor benefits
based on the company work rules” should be construed instead as an
agreement to pay, “at a minimum, an amount rising to a level considered to
174

Id.
Article 537 (1) of the Civil Code states: “If one of the parties promises in a contract that he/she
will tender a certain performance to any third party, the third party shall have the right to claim that
performance directly from the obligor.” Minpō [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 537, para. 1.
176
See Nagoya Chihō Saibansho, Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 288; Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho
[Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 24, 2002, Hei 13 (Ne) no. 245, 829 RŌDŌ HANREI 38; Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] Apr. 11, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) no. 1358, 1212 HANREI TAIMUZU 102; Fukushima, supra note 171, at 171172; Takeshi Matsuda, Dantai Teiki Hoken ni Okeru Hihokensha no Chii, 40 SANDAI HŌGAKU (Nos. 3/4)
67 (2007).
177
Nagoya Chihō Saibansho, Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 228-229.
178
Id. at 228-229.
179
Id., 242-250. Sumitomo obtained consent to the policies through the agreement with its employee
union. Id. at 251. See also Fukushima, supra note 171, at 173.
180
Nagoya Chihō Saibansho,Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 228.
181
Id.
182
Saikōsai Saibansho, Apr. 11, 2006, supra note 176 at, 105, citing Nagoya Kōsai [Nagoya High
Ct.] Apr. 24, 2002, Hei 13 (Ne) no. 245, 829 RŌDŌ HANREI 38.
175
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be socially significant.”183 The court found this agreement created a contract
for the benefit of a third party and ordered Sumitomo to pay each surviving
spouse approximately one half of the insurance proceeds.184
The Supreme Court reversed. It found no legislative policy requiring
payment of more than a portion of the insurance proceeds, and, so long as
consent was obtained, no violation of the public order and morals. It found
no grounds to support either an express or implied agreement to pay more
than the death benefits provided for in the work rules.185
The issue is now largely resolved.186 Group term policies now clearly
identify the portions payable to the employee’s survivors, and cap the
portion payable to the employer at no more than twenty million yen. 187 But
the process is telling. The parties start off with identified rights and
obligations set out in the insurance contracts, company work rules, and
employer-employee agreements. Once challenged, the lower courts rewrite
those rights and obligations so that they are “fair.” To use the language of
the Nagoya court, to require payment at a level “considered to be socially
significant.” The contract provides a starting point; an evaluation of the
equities follows.
D.

Contract Law Conclusion

Professors Taylor and Uchida have suggested that following
deregulation in the 1990s, a new role for contract form and practice,
grounded in the “classical view of contracts,” has swept across Japanese
society.188 They describe a “conquest of contract,” and even the paradigm of
family being replaced by contract.189 Part of this stems from a shift to an ex
post facto model based on personal responsibility.190 Part of this stems from
increasing belief that economic efficiency can be achieved “on the basis of
discrete contracts.”191 Regardless of the cause, the “written contract” is now

183

Id.
Id.; Nagoya Chihō Saibansho, Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 240.
185
Saikōsai Saibansho, Apr. 11, 2006, supra note 176, at 106.
186
Matsuda, supra note 176 at 67; Fukushima, supra note 171, at 171; Saikōsai Saibansho, Apr. 11,
2006 April 11, 2006, supra note 176, at 106.
187
Matsuda, supra note 176 at 67; Fukushima, supra note 171, at 171.
188
Taylor & Uchida, supra note 40, at 454, 455.
189
Id. at 465. Neither endorses this shift but question the extent to which Japanese society can
commit to norms where “non-contractual social relations and social relations governed by relational
contracts are displaced by the discrete contract.” Id. at 474.
190
Id. at 456.
191
Id. at 462.
184
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“the device for constructing the relationship, apportioning risk, and also for
articulating new concerns.”192
A review of recent contracts suggests that they are right, down to the
level of shower hoses and rubber stoppers. A review of recent case law
suggests that there is more. Professors Taylor and Uchida question whether
courts will support “a communitarian vision of commerce in which smaller
or weaker transaction parties are protected through operation of law, or
whether ‘the market’ should dictate transaction outcomes.” 193 The lease
renewal cases and group term insurance cases suggest the lower courts
continue to view justice as protecting the weaker transaction party. The
sublease cases involve sophisticated corporate entities and suggest that, even
without a disparity in bargaining power or knowledge, the courts will
intervene to revise a contract so that it is “fair.”
The result is that there are now two sets of norms at work. The first
layer imposed by the written contract, provides a complex, division of rights
and liabilities. The second layer, applied by the courts, incorporates a
totality of the circumstances test to achieve substantive fairness in the
contract. Sophisticated parties evaluate risk and reward, and dicker specific
terms to a contract. Or, they inject specific terms and broad imposition of
liability into adhesion contracts. In either case, when contested, the courts
re-evaluate. Just as courts re-ordered relationships in the 1950s and 1960s
requiring “reasonable grounds” to terminate a residential lease, they re-order
contractual relationships now, even among sophisticated parties, to achieve a
“fair” result.194
The end result is that when disputes arise parties to a contract
negotiate first in the shadow of increasingly detailed contracts. And when
those negotiations fail and the legal process is invoked, they negotiate in the
shadow of equitable norms applied by the courts.
III.

EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACTICE IN JAPAN

Employment law presents another subset of contracts and another
example of law in Japan operating on two levels, with primary ordering
based on complex, detailed contractual norms and secondary ordering based
on more ambiguous, equitable standards. A review of employment
documentation and the case law interpreting it shows that detailed contracts

192
193
194

Id. at 473.
Taylor & Uchida, supra note 40, at 469.
See Segawa, supra note 76, at 8-9.
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specifically defining rights and obligations routinely conflict with the
equitable norms applied by the courts.195
A.

The Employment Relationship

Employer-employee relationships in Japan are varied these days. An
employer may employ a half-dozen different types of employees, including
“life-time” or regular employees; fixed-term employees; part-time
employees; “dispatch” employees, employees provided by a temporary
agency; and employees seconded from affiliated companies.196 The focus
here is on regular employees.
Most do not receive a contract for employment or an engagement
197
letter.
The employer-employee relationship begins with receipt of an
informal offer of employment (naiteisho). 198 That informal offer of
employment simply states that an unofficial offer of employment is being
extended to the prospective employee to begin work on a certain date. 199
The employment relationship itself is governed by separate documents,
including an employee Covenant on Employment (shūshoku seiyakusho),200
a Personal Guaranty (mimoto hoshōsho), 201 and the Work Rules (shūgyō
kisoku).202 The first two documents are provided with the informal offer of
employment and require signatures and affixing the employee’s personal
seal as a condition for starting work.203 The last document, the Work Rules,
is usually provided to employees when they start work.204 As set out below,
195

For comprehensive discussion of employment law issues, in Japanese, see, e.g., KAZUO SUGENO,
RŌDŌ HŌ (9th ed. 2010) and, in English, see, e.g., HIDEKI THURGOOD KANO, JAPAN STAFF EMPLOYMENT
LAW GUIDE (2010); Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the
Service of–Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996).
196
See, e.g., KANO, supra note 196, at 17-18; Yutaka Asao, Overview of Non-Regular Employment
in Japan (Japanese Institute for Labour Policy and Training) available at www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/doc
uments/jilpt-reports/no.10_japan.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
197
Makoto Ishida, Kigyō Sōshiki to Rōdōhō–Hendō no Rekishi to Kadai, 206 SHŪKAN RŌDŌHŌ 14,
21 (2004). Most regular employees are not provided with a written contract; the company’s work rules are
considered the employment contract. Id.
198
Id.; Offers of Employment (2007-2012) on file with author.
199
Ishida, supra note 198, at 21.
200
Covenants on Employment (1957, 2007-2012) on file with author.
201
Personal Guarantees (2007-2011) on file with author.
202
Work Rules (2009-2012) on file with author.
203
See Covenants on Employment, supra note 201; see also Personal Guarantees, supra note 202; see
also Osaka Pref. Govt., Rōdō Sōdan Q & A 11, available at http://www.pref.osaka.jp/sogorodo/roudouqa/q
a11.html.
204
See, e.g., Tokyou Rōdōkyoku, Shuugyou Kisoku Sakusei no Tebiki, available at http://tokyoroudoukyoku.jsite.mhlw.go.jp/hourei_seido_tetsuzuki/roudoukijun_keiyaku/k-kisoku.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2012); Rōdō Keiyaku Hō [Labor Contract Act], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 7, translated in
Ministry of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/de
tail/?ft=1&re=02&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=01&ky=labor+contract+act&page=20.
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the contents of each of these documents have trended towards increasing
specificity and attempts to contractually impose liability on employees—
attempts which have been thwarted by the courts.
1.

Covenant on Employment

In 1957, a group of manufacturers published a template for the
employee’s Covenant on Employment that enumerated just three articles.
The new employee vowed to 1) uphold the work rules, work in good faith,
and avoid disrupting the workplace; 2) not disclose confidential information,
either during or after employment; and 3) compensate the employer for
losses caused to the company by the employee’s intentional or grossly
negligent acts.205 The employee acknowledged in the oath that if he or she
violated the covenant, he or she may be terminated or face other disciplinary
action.206
A 2007 template requires more. In it a new employee promises to 1)
abide by the work rules, supervisor's directions, and work in good faith; 2)
refrain from disclosing, either during or after employment, any confidential
information held by the company; 3) refrain from engaging in any political
or group activities that would disrupt the workplace; 4) compensate the
employer for any damages caused to the company intentionally or through
gross negligence; and 5) refrain from objecting should the employee's place
or type of work be changed because of business necessity.207
A recent 2011 example goes further still. The new employee pledges,
as a condition of employment, to 1) faithfully observe all relevant laws, the
work rules, and other rules and directives; 2) refrain from engaging in any
conduct that damages the reputation or credibility of the employer or its
clients; 3) affirm that no misrepresentations were made in the employee’s
application materials; 4) maintain the confidentiality of employer and client
information; and 5) refrain from removing confidential information from the
workplace.208
The 2011 covenant then focuses on liability. The employee must
expressly pledge, as a condition of employment, that 6) if the employee
leaks company information outside the company, during employment or
after, or is found to be responsible for other “incidents” resulting in damage
to the company, the employee will assume liability to compensate the
205

Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, Seiyakusho Oyobi Mimoto Hoshōsho no Mondaiten to Shoshikirei,
1423 RŌSEI JIHŌ 26 (May 24, 1957).
206
Id. at 26.
207
Covenant on Employment (Mar. 10, 2007), on file with author.
208
Covenant on Employment (Oct. 3, 2011), on file with author.
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employer for any damages suffered. The employee must also acknowledge
that 7) if he or she violates these covenants, relevant laws, the work rules, or
other regulations and policies, he or she may be subject to disciplinary action
including termination, and, if these violations result in “direct or indirect”
damage to the employer, the employee again “assumes full liability.” 209
While one might expect a confidentiality agreement, how many entrylevel employment relationships elsewhere start with an indemnification
agreement, repeated twice to make absolutely clear where liability lies? The
literature suggests requesting such covenants is “the norm” among
employers. 210 A recent survey of private universities suggests that,
regardless of whether provided for in the Work Rules, 86.5% of the
universities require employees sign Covenants on Employment.211
The implication is that their use is widespread, and that the starting
point in ordering employment relationships in Japan is a document detailing
specific rights and obligations in a manner and to a degree not found even in
“litigious” countries. Some have suggested that the purpose of the covenant
is to “raise awareness” and that it has no legal meaning in and of itself; it is
simply a “factual act” (jijitsu kōi). 212 The language of the covenant,
however, is the language of contract clearly defining rights and liability,
assumptions of risk, and indemnification.213
2.

Personal Guarantees

The concern about indemnification, repeated twice in the covenant,
continues in the personal guaranty document demanded of new employees.
Pursuant to this document, a third party assumes joint liability, with the new
employee, and agrees to indemnify the company for any damage sustained
by the company as a result of actions of the employee.214
Personal guarantees have been used for decades. 215 The earliest
personal guarantees were used simply to confirm identity. 216 Some included
promises to search for and return employees who had run away or to accept
209

Id. The document concludes with a separate section detailing the employee’s agreement regarding
employer use of his or her personal information. Id.
210
Osaka Pref. Govt, Rōdō Soudan Q & A 11, supra note 204; Chieko Shitayama, Shinnyuu Shain ni
Teishutsu Saseru Shourui no Houritsu Mondai to Tadashii Atsukaikata, KIGYOU JITSUMU 88 (Mar. 2008).
211
Seiyakusho∙Mimoto Hoshoshou ni Kan Suru Anketo Kekka, 426 SHIGAKU KEIEI 89 (Aug. 2010).
212
Id. at 90-91; Osaka Pref. Govt, Rōdō Soudan Q & A 11, supra note 204.
213
Id. Cases that have challenged the covenants have focused on employee refusal to submit them.
Id.
214
Personal Guarantees, supra note 201.
215
KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 108-13.
216
Id. at 108.
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responsibility for employees who fell ill.217 Guarantees after World War II
came to focus on liability. A 1959 survey suggested that 94% of companies
required personal guarantees. 218 In them, the guarantors would vaguely
“accept full responsibility to ensure no inconvenience is caused to the
employer by employing this person” 219 or more specifically “to promptly
compensate the company for damages caused by the employee to the
company.”220
A 2007 template has the guarantor agreeing to “promptly
compensate,” jointly with the employee, the employer for “any monetary
damages or damage to the employer’s good name caused by the employee.”
The employer, in turn, agrees to notify the guarantor without delay if (a) it
becomes aware of any facts suggesting that the employee may not be fit for
employment or act in good faith, which may give rise to liability on the part
of the guarantor, or (b) the employee changes position, and this results in
added liability or a difficulty of supervision on the part of the guarantor.221
The 2011 example again goes further. It has the third party act as a
“personal guarantor” of the new employee for “all aspects” of the new
employee and “guarantee” that the new employee will “work faithfully and
observe the Covenant on Employment, Work Rules, and other applicable
rules and directives.”222 There is broad language about vague concepts like
“working faithfully,” but the guarantor also specifically assumes “full
liability,” jointly with the employee, to “immediately compensate” the
employer for any damages “direct or indirect” if the employee violates any
provision on the Covenant on Employment, Work Rules, or other rules or
directives, for a period of five years from the date of the contract.223
From early on, the courts have limited such imposition of liability. 224
As early as 1929, a Japanese court reviewed a personal guarantee for an
employee that imposed unlimited liability on the guarantor and limited it to a
“reasonable amount.”225 Later courts adopted and expanded this holding,226

217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
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Id. at 109.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 108.
Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra note 206, at 26.
Personal Guaranty (Feb. 17, 2007), on file with author.
Id.
Personal Guaranty (Oct. 2, 2011), on file with author. Id.
Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra note 206, at 26, 30.
KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 110-11.
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and the Diet codified it in the Law Regarding Personal Guarantees enacted
in 1933.227
The Personal Guarantees Law limits the guarantee to a renewable
period of five years, three if no term is stated. 228 It requires that the
employer notify the guarantor 1) if there is evidence of unsatisfactory work
performance or bad faith; or 2) if there are any material changes in the type
of work the employee performs or its location.229 In either case, following
notice, the law allows the guarantor to cancel the guarantee. 230 If the
employer fails to provide such notice, that provides grounds to reduce the
liability of the guarantor.231 Regardless of notice, the law instructs a court
before imposing liability to consider “each and every circumstance,
compared with the other,” including those circumstances giving rise to the
guarantor becoming a guarantor, and the work responsibilities and personal
history of the employee.232
Standard interpretation of these provisions is that if the employer
promoted the employee to a position of responsibility, the employer should
be held responsible, not the guarantor. 233 Courts have held a refusal to
provide a personal guaranty constitutes grounds for dismissal. 234 But, in
reviewing a claim for damages based on the guarantee, they will examine
any negligence on the part of the employer, the circumstances giving rise to
the claim, and changes in the employee’s work or physical condition, i.e.
courts will examine the circumstances in their totality. As a result, simple
negligence on the part of the employee will rarely give rise to an order for
the guarantor to pay damages, and if any are ordered they are limited in
amount.235
Some sources suggest requesting a personal guarantee is “the
norm,”236 and surveys suggest the reason for utilizing these contracts is to
raise employee awareness and provide a basis for claiming employee
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Mimoto Hoshōnin ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Law Regarding Personal Guarantees], Law No. 42 of
1933, art. 1 Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgibin/idxsearch.cgi.
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Id. at art. 3, para. 2.
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Id. at art. 4.
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Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra note 206, at 26, 30.
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liability if a problem arises. 237 The effect is to create layers of the law
governing employment relationships, starting with detailed documents
assigning rights and liabilities, which the case law and statutory law then
eviscerate.238
But employers continue to use them, creating more complex, detailed
impositions of liability in the process. Instead of bargaining in the shadow
of the law, employers bargain for more than the law permits and negotiate on
that basis until the dispute escalates to the point of intervention by legal
counsel or the courts. At that point, specific norms are modified or replaced
by “totality of the circumstances” standards.
3.

Work Rules

After the employee walks in the door, the Work Rules govern
employee rights and duties. Work Rules are mandatory for any employer
with over ten employees,239 and, as Japan’s Labor Contract Act makes clear,
they are considered a binding contract between the employer and the
employee.240 No signatures are required, but the document must be filed
with the local labor bureau. 241 Any changes must be negotiated with a
representative of the majority of employees in the work place, who will
submit an opinion letter regarding the changes that is filed with the labor
bureau.242
237

Id.; Yamashita Chieko, Shinnyuushain ni Teishutsu Saseru Shorui no Houritsu Mondai to
Tadashii Atsukai, KIGYŌ JITSUMU 88 (March 2008).
238
Professor Kawashima cites to personal guarantees as evidence of the gap between the law and
expectations. KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 109-12. The vague language of the
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(giri), and representations the new employee will not cause problems. If problems do arise, the expectation
is that the employer and guarantor will negotiate a solution, and in practice they do, with the guarantor
accepting some liability in some cases and not in others. When courts have been confronted with claims,
they have adjusted them, on a case-by-case basis, rendering specific terms indefinite. According to
Professor Kawashima, the Law Regarding Personal Guaranties was drafted and passed by the Ministry of
Justice Civil Affairs section to reconcile this difference between the law and people's general perceptions of
what it means to act as a guarantor. Id.
239
Id. Rōdō Kijun Hō [Labor Standards Act], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 89-90, translated in Ministry
of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
240
Labor Contract Act, supra note 204. Article 7 states that if an employer informs the employee of
reasonable rules of employment, those rules, unless modified in a separate writing, provide the “contents of
the labor contract.” Id. Articles 9 et seq. codify the process and standards for “change to the contents of a
labor contract based on rules of employment.” Id.
241
Tokyō Rōdōkyoku [Tokyo Labor Bureau], Shūgyō Kisoku no Sakusei Todokede, http://tokyoroudoukyoku.jsite.mhlw.go.jp/hourei_seido_tetsuzuki/roudoukijun_keiyaku/s-kisoku.html (last visited June
4, 2012).
242
Id. Articles 9 & 10 of the Labor Contract Act provide a framework for the employer to change the
work rules without the consent of representatives of the work place. Article 9 precludes, absent consent, a
change to the work rules adversely that affects employees unless that change satisfies Article 10. Article
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Standard work rules contain extensive terms covering hiring and
probation; requirements for the employee’s personal guarantors; terms
covering transfer and leave; retirement and dismissals; work hours, breaks,
and holidays; pregnancy and childcare leave; rules of conduct; use of
company assets; confidentiality requirements; safety and hygiene rules;
standards and procedures for disciplining employees; and compensation for
work-place injuries.243 Separate rules setting out standards and procedures
for disbursing salary and benefits are commonly incorporated by reference
into the Work Rules.244
B.

Courts and the Rights to Dismiss

This “employment contract,” addressing everything from uniforms to
lunchtime, might be a hundred pages long. Their standards of conduct and
dismissal provisions, however, are noteworthy because the rights and
obligations enumerated are, again, just the starting point.
An employer’s right to dismiss an employee under the Work Rules is
commonly divided into “ordinary dismissal” and “disciplinary dismissal.”245
Discussion of both types, and related case law, follows. Once again
employers bargain for more than the law permits, until the courts intervene
and specific rights are replaced by reasonableness and “the common sense of
society.”
1.

Ordinary Dismissal

Standard bases in the Work Rules for ordinary dismissal include 1)
when it is determined that the employee is unable to bear the work because
of a physical or mental disability; 2) when it is determined that the
employee’s ability or work record is inadequate such that employment is not
10 provides that if notice is given and if the change to the rules is reasonable “in light of the extent of the
disadvantage to be incurred by the worker, the need for changing the working conditions, the
appropriateness of the contents of the changed rules of employment, the status of negotiations with a labor
union or the like, or any other circumstances pertaining to the change to the rules of employment, the
working conditions that constitute the contents of a labor contract shall be in accordance with such changed
rules of employment.” Labor Contract Act, supra note 205. The ability of the representative of the
majority of the employees in the workplace to influence changes in the workplace depends largely on
employer/employee relationships. Labor bureaus will not reject filing of changes to the work rules because
of objections lodged by employee representatives. Challenges to the validity of those changes require
filing a complaint with a labor tribunal or the courts. See, e.g., Japan Institute for Labor Policy and
Training, Rōdō Mondai Q & A (Kaiseiban), available at http://www.jil.go.jp/rodoqa/05_kisoku/05Q01.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
243
NOBUNORI ISHIZAKI ET AL., SHŪGYŌ KISOKU NO HŌRITSU JITSUMU 660-701 (2010); see also
Work Rules, supra note 206.
244
ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 680.
245
Id.; Work Rules, supra note 202.
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appropriate; 3) when there is no improvement after warnings regarding
unsatisfactory work attitudes; 4) when the employee fails to cooperate and
adversely impacts work done by other employees; 5) when there is
downsizing of the enterprise or other unavoidable business necessity; and 6)
when there are other conditions evidencing a lack of qualifications to work
as a company employee.246
Setting aside the first criterion and what it says about disability law in
247
Japan, the remaining criteria suggest that if you don’t do your job or if the
employer doesn’t need you, the employer can fire you. The courts, however,
have long suggested something different.
They have for decades
substantively reviewed and regularly invalidated ordinary dismissals by the
employer.248
While the Civil Code provides that when no term is fixed either party
may terminate the employment relationship on two weeks’ notice, 249 in
1975, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he exercise of the employer’s right to
dismiss shall be null and void as an abuse of right if the dismissal is not
based on reasonable cause or is viewed as improper from the general
viewpoint of society.”250 Subsequent courts have held that “even when there
is a reason for ordinary dismissal, the employer is not always permitted to
dismiss the employee.”251
More recent cases tell the same story. In 2006, Kitagawa Sangyō, a
kitchenware manufacturer, fired a regular employee after eight years with
the company.252 A Tokyo District Court reviewed the dismissal and found
that the employee had violated company work rules, repeatedly. The
246

ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 667; see also KANO, supra note 196, at 234; Work Rules,
supra note 203; compare Ryuichi Yamakawa, From Security to Mobility? Changing Aspects of Japanese
Dismissal Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 486 (Daniel H. Foote 2007).
247
See, e.g., Jun Nakagawa & Peter Blank, Future of Disability Law in Japan: Employment and
Accommodation, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173 (2010).
248
See, e.g., Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of–
Stability?, supra note 196.
249
Civil Code, supra note 174, at art. 627.
250
See Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 487. The abuse of rights doctrine was codified in Article 1(3)
of Civil Code in 1947, and states that ‘[n]o abuse of rights shall be permitted.” Its origins date back to
decisions by the Supreme Court of Cassation during the Taisho period and before that to the reception of
France law during the Meiji Reformation. Kazuaki Sono & Yasuhiro Fujioka, The Role of the Abuse of
Right Doctrine in Japan, 35 LA. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1975). In 1919, in Shimizu v. Japan, the Supreme
Court of Cassation enunciated the doctrine, finding the National Railway had abused a legal right to run
trains through a switching yard, when it did so in a manner that resulted in pollution that killed a famous
pine tree located nearby. Id. at 1041.
251
Shioda v. Kōchi Broadcasting Company, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 1977) trans. by
Kazuo Sugeno, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 62, at 545, 546.
252
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 18, 2007, 947 RŌDŌ HANREI 23, translated by Elizabeth
Cantu, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CODES, CASES, AND COMMENTARY
641 (2d ed. 2012).
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employee had, inter alia, erased email data from a company computer and
lied about it; misrepresented his title and authority in correspondence with
suppliers; obstructed attempts to gather related correspondence; and
slandered other employees.253 The court, however, found these acts “are not
so abhorrently blameworthy that they could justify firing an employee.” 254
The court pointed out that no prior disciplinary action had been taken against
the employee; the employer had known about the violations for over a year
before dismissing him, which suggested that they did not deem the
violations serious; and the employee had committed no further “particularly
troublesome deeds.” 255 As a result, despite the work rule violations
expressly providing for termination of the employee, the dismissal “lacks
any objective reasonableness and, is improper according to the sense of
society, and is invalid.”256
The courts treat poor performance similarly to work rule violations.
More often than not, it is simply not enough to justify dismissal. 257 In 1999,
a Tokyo District Court reviewed Sega Enterprises’ dismissal of an employee
after eight years of employment.258 After years of problems, the employee’s
boss told him to look for work elsewhere in the company; citing attitude
problems, no other department would take him. Sega then dismissed the
employee for “deficient work ability and no prospect for improvement.” 259
The court, on review, recognized numerous attempts to find work the
employee could perform, and that the employee’s evaluations ranked in the
bottom ten percent of the company. 260 But the court ruled that simply
because the worker was below average did not justify termination.261 The
employer had an obligation to provide additional, comprehensive education
and instruction because there appeared to be room to improve the
employee’s performance. The court found no evidence of comprehensive
education and instruction, and, as a result, insufficient evidence to support a
finding of “deficient work ability and no prospect for improvement.”262
253

Id. at 642-49.
Id. at 652.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌKIJUN TO JITSUMU 128 (Rōdō Hanrei Kenkyūkai ed., 2010).
258
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Oct. 15, 1999, Hei 11 (Yo) no. 21055, 1050 HANREI TAIMUZU
129, 770; see also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 258, at 128-129; NIHON
RŌDŌ BENGODAN, (Ikensho) Kaiko Ru-ru nado no Shuchi ni Kan Suru Ikensho (Sept. 26, 2003), available
at http://roudou-bengodan.org/proposal/detail/gen030926a.php.
259
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Oct. 15, 1999, supra note 258 at 133-35.
260
Id. at 137.
261
Id. at 138.
262
Id.
254
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In 2001, a Tokyo District Court reviewed an insurance company’s
termination of an employee for “conspicuously poor work abilities.”263 The
court found that employment until retirement is presumed under Japan’s
employment system and, as a result, dismissal of a regular employee based
on poor work performance extremely disadvantageous to the worker.264 The
court held that real obstruction or damage to the business or its operations is
necessary, or there must be a risk of significant damage such that the
employer must remove the employee from the company. There can be no
prospect for improvement, no extenuating circumstances, and no possibility
for transfer or demotion. 265 The court in this case found the employees’
termination a part of the company’s efforts to restructure, rather than based
on significantly poor work performance, and voided it as an abuse of
rights.266
Courts affirm dismissals, but it takes a lot. Tokyo Marine Insurance
Company dismissed an employee who spent years on sick leave and, while
not on sick leave, came to work late and repeatedly failed to follow
instructions, requiring significant company time spent correcting errors.
Pursuant to its Work Rules, it found “remarkably poor work ability so as to
hinder company performance” and terminated the employee. 267 He sued,
arguing that his performance was not so bad as to “disrupt proper business
function.” 268 In 2000, a Tokyo District Court found that was not the
standard, but, even if it was, this employee’s performance presented a risk of
“disrupting proper business function” and no abuse of rights as a result.269
Courts that have found below average work skills a sufficient basis to
terminate the employee emphasize the extensive efforts by the employer to
avoid termination. In 2001, a Tokyo District Court reviewed the dismissal of
an employee hired as an “installation specialist” at the consulting firm
Proudfoot Japan, Ltd.270 The court found the employee in his first year and a
half worked on five projects and for four did not possess the average level of
skills required, and that his gaining the necessary skills was unlikely. The
263

Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Aug. 10, 2001, Hei (Yo) no. 21081, 1116 HANREI TAIMUZU 148149; see also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 126-27; NIHON RŌDŌ
BENGODAN, supra note 258.
264
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Aug. 10, 2001, supra note 263, at 152-53.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 155-56.
267
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], July 28, 2000, Hei (wa) no. 19747, 797 RŌDŌ HANREI 65; see
also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 130.
268
Tokyo Dist. Ct. July 28, 2000, supra note 267.
269
Id.
270
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Apr. 26, 2000, Hei (wa) no. 6384, 789 RŌDŌ HANREI 21; see also
RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 132.
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employer and employee spent three months negotiating different work
responsibilities, i.e. another job, but were unable to reach an agreement, after
which the employee was terminated. The court found an “objectively
reasonable basis” for the dismissal and no abuse of rights.271
The end result is that while the Work Rules clearly provide the
employer with the right to dismiss bad employees, the courts regularly
modify that right. They substantively review disciplinary decisions and
frequently invalidate them. The Work Rules are a detailed employment
contract specifically allocating rights and responsibilities, but they present
only the first layer of legal norms governing the relationship. The second
layer, available after invoking the legal process, applies equity and reviews
whether the dismissal was “justified” or “an abuse of rights.”
2.

Economic Dismissal

The work rules cited above, and most others, reserve a blanket right to
dismiss based on economic necessity, in other words to restructure. The
courts have limited that right as well. Economic dismissals, categorized as a
type of “ordinary dismissal,” must satisfy four “requirements” or
“factors”. 272 There must be a showing of 1) necessity to reduce the
workforce; 2) good faith efforts by the employer to avoid dismissals; 3)
reasonable criteria in selecting employees to be discharged; and 4)
reasonable efforts to explain and obtain the consent of the trade union or
workers regarding the dismissals.273
Early cases and commentary interpreted the above as “requirements”,
all of which must be met in order to justify dismissal. The Tokyo High
Court’s 1979 Tōyō Oxygen Company decision defines this approach. 274
Following extended losses, Tōyō Oxygen announced its decision to shut
down a division and dismiss the employees. It negotiated retirement
allowances with the unions, which the majority of division employees
rejected. The employees filed suit alleging an abuse of the right to dismiss.
275

The district court found proof of an economic need to close the
division, but a failure to prove that the process was “socially reasonable”
271

Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 26, 2000, supra note 271.
Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 487; RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note
257, at 137.
273
Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 487-88.
274
Tokyo Kōsai [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 29, 1979, Sho 51 (Ne) no. 1028, 401 HANREI TAIMUZU 41
trans. by Kazuo Sugeno, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 62, at 547.
275
Id.
272

636

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 22 NO. 3

(shakai teki sōtōsei) and found for the plaintiffs.276 The Tokyo High Court
affirmed the dismissals, but, in doing so, confirmed that such dismissals
must satisfy three substantive requirements and a separate procedural
requirement:
First, the closing . . . must be based upon unavoidable necessity
from the viewpoint of a reasonable management of the
enterprise . . . . Second, dismissal due to the closure . . . should
not be arbitrary on the employer’s part. Such a dismissal can be
held not arbitrary only if there is no room for transferring the
employees . . . Third, the selection of the actual retirees should
be based on objective and reasonable criteria.277
The court then required procedural fairness: “regardless of any labor
agreements . . . proceeding without the acceptance of the union or without
sufficient negotiation regarding the dismissal, or implementing dismissals
that violate good faith procedural principles . . . will void the dismissal.”278
Recent courts have relaxed this standard, requiring only that these
“factors” be considered as part of “the totality of the circumstances.”279 In
1999, National Westminster Bank closed its trade finance division and, after
determining that there was no other position suitable for plaintiff’s skills,
dismissed him. In reviewing the dismissal, the Tokyo District Court
characterized the above standard as: “a categorization of factors to consider
in determining whether a termination . . . amounts to an abuse of the right of
dismissal. They are not intended as discrete legal requirements.” Decisions
regarding dismissal are “to be made examining in its totality the individual,
concrete circumstances of each case.”280
Applying this standard, the court found no abuse of rights.
As
available positions at the bank all required expertise that plaintiff lacked, it
was “practically impossible” to continue the employee in his current position
at his current salary, and his dismissal was “rational” as a result. The court
focused on the bank’s “good faith efforts.” The bank gave due consideration
to “living maintenance” (seikatsu iji) by providing a substantial retirement
package and unlimited access to re-employment services, 281 and it made
repeated efforts to explain and gain acceptance to the dismissal by
276

Id.
Id.; RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 138-39.
278
Tokyo Kōsai, Oct. 29, 1979, supra note 274, at 43.
279
Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 501; RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note
257, at 140, 143; Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] January 21, 2000, Hei 11 (yo) no. 21217, 782 R ŌDŌ
H ANREI 23.
280
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jan. 21, 2000, supra note 279.
281
Id.
277
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participating in numerous “group negotiations” (dantai kōshō) with the
employee’s union.282
The court showed newfound deference to the employer, finding that
“restructuring is intended to strengthen competitiveness,” and this “type of
business decision relating to operational planning is one based on a high
level of technical expertise,” which “should be respected.” 283 But even
where dismissal is justified, the court weighed this deference against
disruption to the workers’ livelihood and held that sufficient consideration
must be given to the affected workers’ living needs for the near future;
assistance with finding new employment provided; and negotiations
conducted to gain the acceptance of the affected workers. 284 “Good faith
efforts in dealing with the restructuring are required.”285
Commentators now suggest that there two different paradigms used
for reviewing economic dismissal, the “four requirements” theory and “four
factors” theory.286 Whether four requirements or four factors, what one finds
is another discrepancy between the private, first level ordering that
contractually defines the employer-employee relationship and reserves a
blanket right of termination to the employer, and second level ordering that
involves court review to determine whether the dismissals were justified and
“good faith efforts” made to avoid restructuring and mitigate its effects.
Restructuring limited to economic necessity and the necessity to mitigate its
effects on employees are nowhere to be found in the Work Rules; they are
found in the case law.287
3.

Disciplinary Dismissal

The Work Rules also commonly provide a list of grounds for
disciplinary dismissals, or termination for cause. The employer may dismiss
for cause for, inter alia, falsification of business reports adversely impacting
the business; violation of confidentiality requirements; theft or misuse of
282

Id. The employer negotiated with the employee and his union seven times over the course of three
months regarding the employee’s termination and retirement package.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 138-42.
287
Commentators have suggested that the degree of financial difficulty necessary to justify
restructuring is determined on a case-by-case basis, with reference to Toyo Oxygen’s standard of
“unavoidable necessity based on rational management of the company.” This requires something less than
possible bankruptcy and something more than simple business need. Id. at 141. Similarly, the “duty to
avoid dismissal” involves a case-by-case review examining steps take prior to restructuring including
implementation of hiring freezes, furlough days, negotiated pay cuts and other attempts to reduce operating
costs, soliciting voluntary retirement, and job placement services. Id. at 142.
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company property; accepting bribes or bribing public officials; bad faith,
egregious violation of a company directive or rule; intentional acts resulting
in significant damage to the company; and a catch-all of “other inappropriate
conduct of a similar magnitude.” 288 The bar for disciplinary dismissal,
however, is high.
The starting point is the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Kōchi
Broadcasting.289 There, a radio announcer overslept twice, and lied about it
the second time.290 His employer dismissed him, and he filed suit arguing
dismissal was too severe a punishment and constituted an abuse of the right
of dismissal. The courts, at each stage, voided the dismissal. The Supreme
Court found that a “dismissal could be null and void as an abuse of the right
of dismissal when the dismissal is extremely unreasonable and not to be
admitted to be appropriate based on the common sense of society depending
on the actual circumstances of the individual case.” For the newscaster,
“[j]udging from these circumstances, to dismiss plaintiff is rather too severe
and tends to lack reasonableness. Thus the dismissal could possibly be
regarded as inappropriate in the common sense of society.” 291
The Supreme Court in 1977 explicitly acknowledged the consensus of
society may conflict with the Work Rules: “[t]he employer may not always
discharge workers even when there exists a fact that constitutes reason for
dismissal stipulated under work rules. If a dismissal is excessively
unreasonable and impermissible from the viewpoint of general society, such
a dismissal shall be null and void as an abuse of right.”292
More recent lower courts have affirmed disciplinary dismissals, but
they do so following an exhaustive review and it takes more than violating
the Work Rules. In 2002, a Tokyo District Court reviewed a claim for
wrongful termination brought by an employee hired as a newspaper
reporter.293 After ten years of inaccurate articles, problems with sources and
colleagues, and missed deadlines, the newspaper transferred him to HR.294
In his new assignment, he continued to make mistakes and refused to follow
instructions, for which his employer reprimanded him. He began to leave
early, for which his employer docked his pay, and again refused to follow
288

ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 687.
See, e.g., RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 178; Nihon Rōdō
Bengodan, supra note 258.
290
Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1977, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17 trans. by Kazuo Sugeno
reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 62, at 545, 546.
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Id.
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Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 486.
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Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 22, 2002, Hei 11 (wa) no. 4526, 830 RŌDŌ HANREI 52; see
also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 181.
294
Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 22, 2002, supra note 293.
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instructions, for which the newspaper suspended him. After his suspension,
he simply stopped coming to work. The employer emailed, faxed, and sent
certified letters, requesting that he submit a leave of absence form or return
to work; he refused. In 2002, they fired him. 295 The employee argued this
was an abuse of rights. The court focused on the repeated absences and
repeated refusal to follow instructions. It found the employee committed
gross violations of the work rules, and the employer made numerous
attempts to correct the situation before terminating him.296 In its totality, this
justified the employer’s termination of the employee.297
In 2005, the Fukuoka High Court reviewed a wrongful termination
claim in which a driving school instructor used a company laptop to frequent
dating websites.298 Over the course of four months, he sent approximately
800 messages, one-half during work hours, and posted solicitations for sex.
He used his company email address for this, and the postings were publicly
accessible. After discovering the activity, and in light of previous
disciplinary problems, the company asked him to resign. He refused. The
company suspended him, and, after a meeting of their disciplinary
committee, fired him.299 The employer sued alleging an “abuse of rights,”
and the Fukuoka High Court found that the employee had violated his
obligation to work during work hours and recklessly damaged the reputation
of the company, for which termination was appropriate.300
What is remarkable is that this was a close call: the district court
found the termination was an abuse of rights. It found that most of the
messages sent were harmless; the solicitations for sex limited in number; and
the instructor had not been negligent in his teaching or driving instruction.
The court observed that the company had no computer use policy, and the
messages had not been the subject of any complaints or attention by the
media until after suit was filed, such that there was no real harm to the
reputation of the company. The district court found that the disciplinary
dismissal was “a little too severe” and an abuse of the right of dismissal.301
In order for disciplinary termination to be deemed justified by the
courts, practitioners suggest that the dereliction of duty must be gross,
continue over a period of time, and the termination proceeded by progressive
295
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Id.
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Id.
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Fukuoka Kōsai [Fukuoaka High Ct.] Sept. 14, 2007, Hei 19 (ne) no. 76, 1223 HANREI TAIMUZU
188; see also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 184.
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Fukuoka Kousai [Fukuoaka High Ct.] Sept. 14, 2007, supra note 298, at 188, 190-91.
300
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sanctions and repeated opportunities to improve.302 All of this becomes part
of the employer’s “duty to make efforts to avoid termination.”303 While the
Work Rules state that if an employee fails to perform or performs poorly, the
employer can fire him or her, if challenged, the courts impose a duty on the
employer to avoid dismissal. Repeated attempts to retrain, find work that
the employee can do, and sanction progressively are necessary to avoid an
“abuse of rights.”304
C.

Employment Law Conclusion

These judicial standards have been codified. Amendments in 2003 to
Japan’s Labor Standards Act state “[a] dismissal shall be null and void as an
abuse of right if the dismissal is not based on reasonable cause or is viewed
as improper from the general viewpoint of society.” 305 Japan’s Labor
Contract Act, effective 2008, reiterates this: “[a] dismissal shall, if it lacks
objectively reasonable grounds and is not considered to be appropriate in
general societal terms, be treated as an abuse of right and be invalid.”306
Disciplinary action, in general, may be voided, “if such disciplinary action
lacks objectively reasonable grounds and is not found to be appropriate in
general societal terms in light of the characteristics and mode of the act
committed by the worker pertaining to such disciplinary action and any other
circumstances.”307
The end result is a set of legal norms, first enunciated by the courts,
now codified, that provide the courts with a means to review employer
action and impose equitable standards, standards based on the totality of the
circumstances and “general societal terms.” Those standards are applied,
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however, only after application and challenge to a very different set of
norms.
First level ordering in the hiring documents, the Covenant on
Employment and Personal Guarantee, state that the employee is responsible
for any damage he or she causes the company. Second level ordering, by the
courts, limits that. First level ordering in the Work Rules provides that
employers can fire an employee who doesn’t perform or is no longer
necessary and demand indemnification for any damages. Second level
ordering limits that.
Some practitioners suggest that “a good HR manager can get rid of a
lot of employees” by “convincing them that their retirement is inevitable.”308
But they are convinced out, rather than forced out. Bargaining happens not
“in the shadow of the law,” but in the shadow of detailed contracts. After the
dispute escalates and the power of the courts is threatened or invoked, then
the more ambiguous norms of the courts apply.
IV.

LAW & NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN

Environmental law and more specifically the legal infrastructure
regulating the Japanese nuclear industry is complex and provides a public
law example of this layering of the law. Wide-ranging regulations and
various regulators oversee the planning, construction, and operation of a
nuclear reactor, but all of this leads to the narrow end of a funnel at which
the prefectural governor and local city mayors sit. Local government
officials decide, based on a “gentlemen’s agreement,” whether or not a
reactor operates.
A.

Regulating Nuclear Energy

This section of the paper is not about March 11 or its causes,309 but it
does introduce the law governing nuclear energy in Japan and that
introduction suggests a complicated formal legal structure followed by a
layer of informal norms. “Western” norms and practice have not replaced
“traditional” norms and practice as Professor Kawashima suggested;
“western” norms and practice, meaning clear delineation of rights and
obligations, operate in conjunction with “traditional” consensus-based
308

Interview with registered foreign lawyer (Tokyo 2012) (on file with author).
Professor Ramseyer offers an explanation: he points to the corporate form and the moral hazard
that arises from liability capped at the fire-sale value of power companies’ net assets. J Mark Ramseyer,
Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 457 (2012) [hereinafter Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines].
309
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norms. A discussion of the basic statutory framework, regulatory structure,
licensing and inspection system, and then judicial and local government
review follows.
1.

Statutory Framework

Regulation of the nuclear industry in Japan starts with the Basic
Nuclear Energy Act.310 First passed in 1955, it establishes a framework for
nuclear energy research, development, and use.311 It limits each to peaceful
use and requires establishment of safety measures and international
cooperation.312 In pursuit of “peaceful use” and “securing safety,” the act
establishes three basic principles for the industry: independence, openness,
and civil, as opposed to military, use.313
Within this basic framework, the Nuclear Substances, Nuclear Fuel
and Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act (“Regulation Act”) 314 and the
Prevention of Radiation Injuries due to Radioisotopes Act (“Radiation
Injuries Prevention Act”)315 are the primary technical statutes.316 The former
regulates commercial nuclear reactors producing electricity; creates a
regulatory framework for their establishment and construction; provides
authority for safety regulations, licensing, and inspections; and establishes a
framework for imposing penalties for noncompliance. 317 The Regulation
310

Genshiryoku Kihon Hō [Basic Nuclear Energy Act], Law No. 186 of 1955, available at
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; see also Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni no
Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, at II-1; KENKICHI HIROSE, WAKARIYASUI GENSHIRYOKU KISEI
KANKEI NO HŌREI TEBIKI 6 (2011).
311
Genshiryoku Kihon Hō [Basic Nuclear Energy Act], supra note 310, arts. 1-2; see also Kantei,
supra note 310; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 6-8.
312
Basic Nuclear Energy Act, supra note 310; see also Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no
Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 313 at II-1; HIROSE, supra note 313.
313
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 6; LDP and Komeito additions to the June 2012 Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Establishment Act revised the Basic Nuclear Energy Act so that it now states that nuclear
energy is to be “used with the goal of contributing to the security of Japan.” Cabinet members have
suggested this language does not change the three principles of independence, openness, and civilian use,
but the change does reflect thinking by many that Japan’s civilian nuclear industry operates as military
deterrent. Genshiryoku Kihon Hō: Mokuteki ni ‘Anzen Hoshō’ Kisei Hō no Fusoku De, MAINICHI
SHIMBUN (June 21, 2012), http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20120622k0000m010083000c.html; Japan’s
military defense chief Morimoto sees nuclear plants as a deterrent, favors 25% option for energy mix, THE
JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20120906b4.html.
314
Kakugenryō Busshitsu, Kakunenryōbusshitsu Oyobi Genshiro no Kisei ni Kan Suru Hōrits
[Nuclear Substances, Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act (“Regulation Act”)], Law No. 166
of 1957, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
315
Hōshasei Dōi Genso Nado ni Yoru Hōshasen Shōgai no Bōshi ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Law on the
Preventions of Radiation Injuries due to Radioisotopes (“Radiation Injuries Prevention Act”)], Law No.
167 of 1957, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S32/S32HO167.html.
316
HIROSE, supra note 310 at 8.
317
The Regulation Act is broken down based on activity, e.g., refinement, processing, nuclear
reactors, storage, re-processing. With regard to reactor operation, Chapter 4 of the Act regulates the
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Act’s stated goals are comprehensive regulation that prevents accidents and
protects public safety; protects fissile material and public security; and
complies with international treaty obligations regulating the peaceful use of
nuclear materials.318
The Radiation Injuries Prevention Act establishes a regulatory
framework for handling all radioactive materials. 319 Incorporating
International Commission on Radiological Protection (“ICRP”) standards,
the act regulates the registration, sale, lease, transportation, handling, and
disposal of radioactive materials. 320 It establishes standards for the
placement of facilities utilizing radioactive materials, their construction,
maintenance, and inspections. 321 It establishes usage standards, exposure
standards, industry standards, inspections relating to industry workers and
health maintenance requirements, record-keeping requirements, ongoing
education requirements, as well as standards for transportation and handling
of radioactive materials. 322 The law is supplemented by the Technical
Standards for the Prevention of Radiation Injuries Act,323 which establishes a
Radiation Deliberative Council that is tasked with developing standards for
the prevention of radiation exposure injuries. 324 Regulatory agencies
promulgating related standards are required to consult this deliberative
council,325 and ensure that the new standards incorporate those established
under the Radiation Injuries Preventions Act.326

establishment and operation of reactors; Chapter 6 nuclear energy enterprises; Chapter 6(3) welding and
other inspections; and Chapter 8 penalties for noncompliance. Regulation Act, supra note 314; see also
Kantei, supra note 310. Rules based on the statute include, inter alia, the Rules Relating to the
Establishment and Operation of Nuclear Reactors for Generating Electricity and Notice establishing
Radiation Limits. Id.
318
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 30. Regulated entities include refiners; processors; reactor operators;
post-use storage, processing, and disposal operations. Id. at 31.
319
Radiation Injuries Prevention Act, supra note 315.
320
Id. See also Mombukagakusho [MEXT], Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Hou
Taikei Ni Tsuite, available at, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/anzenkakuho/1260977.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2011). Japan incorporates the ICRP radiation exposure standards, through its Law
regarding Technical Standards for the Prevention of Radiation Injuries (Houshasen Shougai boushi no
Gijutsu Teki Kijun ni Kan Suru Houritsu). HIROSE, supra note 310 at 20, 23.
321
Radiation Injuries Prevention Act, supra note 315.
322
Id. Article 6 requires operators to meet MEXT technical standards in order to obtain approval for
construction and operation.
323
Hōshasei Shōgai Bōshi no Gijutsu teki Kijun ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Law on Technical Standards
for the Prevention of Rational Injuries] Law No. 162 of 1958 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu) [Hōrei DB],
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; HIROSE, supra note 313 at 22.
324
Law on Technical Standards for the Prevention of Rational Injuries, supra note 323, at art. 1. The
council, a shingikai, is housed within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
(MEXT). Id.
325
Id. at art. 6.
326
HIROSE, supra note 310 at 23; Radiation Injuries Prevention Act, supra note 315.
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The Electricity Businesses Act (“Electricity Act”) provides
comprehensive regulatory coverage of all power companies, and also
regulates nuclear power plants. 327 With regard to commercial nuclear
reactors, the Electricity Act establishes separate design and construction
guidelines, as well as an approval process for construction; pre-use
inspections; and regular facility inspections.328 The result is that commercial
nuclear power plants are subject to safety regulation drawn from both the
Regulation Act and the Electricity Act, as well as ordinances, rules, and
notices promulgated pursuant to these statutes.329
These “basic” laws are supplemented by more specialized statutes,
including the Basic Disaster Response Act (“Response Act”) 330 and the
Compensation for Damages from Nuclear Energy Act (“Compensation
Act”).331 The Response Act was passed in 1999, after employees improperly
mixed fuel at the Tokaimura Nuclear Reprocessing facility and the fuel
reached criticality, killing two employees and dispersing radiation into the
surrounding area. 332 The Response Act followed establishing additional
operator requirements to prevent accidents, and providing authority for the
government to issue nuclear emergency declarations, establish a nuclear
accident response headquarters, and implement emergency measures.333
327

Denki Jigyō Hō [Electricity Businesses Act], Law No. 170 of 1964 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu)
[Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku
Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, II-1.
328
Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310 at
II-1. Rules regulating the safety of nuclear reactors based on this statute include the Electricity Businesses
Enforcement Rules, the Ordinance Defining Technical Standards for Energy Generating Nuclear Power
Facilities, and the Technical Standards Relating on Levels of Radioactivity from Electricity Producing
Nuclear Power Facilities. Id.
329
HIROSE, supra note 310 at 9. Cabinet Ordinances (Seirei), Ministerial Ordinances (Shōrei), and
Notices (Kokuji) implement each of these basic statutes. Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni
no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, II-4, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/topics/
2011/pdf/02-shikumi.pdf (last visited March 6, 2012).
330
Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi,
supra note 310, at II-5. HIROSE, supra note 310 at 19. Following the JCO incident, the Nuclear Reactor
Regulatory Act was revised to include additional safety guidelines and regulations implementing additional
safety inspections for currently operating nuclear plants. Id. at 20. The Special Measures Law for
Responding to Nuclear Disasters, enacted in 1999, supplements the Basic Disaster Response Act.
Genshiryoku Saigai Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Hō [Special Measures Law for Responding to Nuclear
Disasters], Law No. 156 of 1999 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu [Hōrei DB]), available at, http://law.egov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
331
Genshiryoku Songai Baishō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Compensation for Damages from Nuclear
Energy Act (“Compensation Act”)] Law No. 47 of 1961, Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu [Hōrei DB],
available at, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
332
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 19, 23. Employees preparing fuel for its fast breeder reactor overfilled
a mixing tank, which reached criticality. See also NOBORU UTATSU, GENSHIRYŌ SONGAI BAISHŌ HŌRITSU
MONDAI 84 (2012).
333
Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310 at
II-5; HIROSE, supra note 310 at 19, 238.
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Japan has not signed onto international agreements addressing liability
for nuclear damage, 334 but its Compensation Act establishes a domestic
compensation framework.335 It creates a strict liability regime for “nuclear
energy enterprises,”336 which covers “injuries arising from nuclear fission,
nuclear radiation arising from nuclear materials, or other related toxic
effects.”337 The strict liability is unlimited in scope, but it is limited to the
operator, the nuclear energy enterprise. 338 The act provides for rights of
indemnity if the damage is caused by the intentional acts of a third party, but
the operator remains liable.339 The stated purpose of the act is to facilitate
payment of claims for compensation by eliminating the need for proof of
negligence or intent; by eliminating the need to identify responsible parties;
and by eliminating limits to those claims.340
The Compensation Act requires all nuclear power plant operators to
insure against risk.341 They do so primarily through private insurance with
the Japanese Atomic Energy Insurance Pool, and secondarily with the
government. 342 The act mandates private insurance of ¥120 billion per
reactor generating over 10,000 kilowatts.343 The Compensation Act, along
with a separate Nuclear Energy Damage Compensation Indemnification
Contract Act, also establishes a framework for “assistance” by the Japanese
government to compensate claims (a) in excess of the above amount, or (b)
for damage not covered because of force majeure.344 Both laws contemplate
334

Hirose, supra note 310, at 246-47, 254. Japan is not a signatory to the Paris Convention on Third
Party Nuclear Liability or the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Id.
335
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 246-47. See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 28-29.
336
Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 3(1). Art. 5(1) focuses liability on the operators and not
the designer, constructor, or other actors. Id. See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 33.
337
Compensation Act supra note 331, at art. 2(2). See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 33.
338
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 247.
339
Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 5.
340
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 248-49. Plaintiffs must prove causation and damages. Ramseyer, Why
Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 466. There are no provisions
regarding how causation is established or what damages are covered. Basic civil law principles apply. See,
e.g., Nichibenren, Tōkyō Denryoku ni Tai Suru Songai Baishō Seikyū Sōron 3-4,
www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/ja/special_them/data/manual01.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). Article
18 of the Compensation Act establishes a Committee for the Resolution of Disputes relating to Damages
from Nuclear Energy. That committee functions as a mediation council; an investigatory body
investigating damages; and a deliberative council establishing guidelines for determining the scope of
damages covered. Compensation Act, supra note 331, at art. 18.
341
Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 6. See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 31. Pursuant to Art.
33(2) of the Regulation Act, failure to properly insure could result in cancellation of the operating permit
for the nuclear reactor. Id.
342
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 249. Art. 8 requires a nuclear power injury liability compensation
insurance contract. Art. 10 requires a separate insurance compensation contract. See UTATSU, supra note
332, at 33.
343
Compensation Act supra note 331, at art. 7(1).
344
Id. at art. 10.
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that the power company remains liable for any amounts paid by the
government through low interest loans or other government assistance.345
Force majeure changes things. Nuclear power plant operators are
strictly liable for any injuries causally related to radiation exposure, unless
“the damage occurs as a result of societal unrest or an anomalous, massive
natural calamity.” 346 Insurance contracts entered into with the Japanese
Atomic Energy Insurance Pool, pursuant to Article 8 of the Compensation
Act, specifically exclude accidents caused by earthquakes, tsunami, or
volcanic eruptions, events covered by a supplemental insurance contact with
the State.347 The Japanese government in that instance assumes liability. 348
After March 11, early debate focused on whether the force majeure
exception to strict liability applied. Commentators argued that it did not and
that the exception to strict liability should be narrowly construed; they
argued that for the force majeure exception to apply the events must be
unforeseeable and without precedent in Japanese history. 349 Historical
records and simulations by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”)
quickly disposed of any such suggestion. 350 On May 10, 2011, TEPCO
announced that it would provide compensation under the Compensation Act
and applied for government assistance to do so.351
In summary, numerous statutes and ordinances provide standards for
radiation protection. They establish regulatory frameworks for “inspections”
by regulatory agencies; “examinations” by regulatory agencies; industry
“maintenance standards;” industry “compliance standards;” emergency
response procedures; administrative sanctions; and compensation for
345

Id. at art. 16; UTATSU, supra note 332, at 34.
Compensation Act supra note 331, at art 3.
347
Id. at arts. 3, 8; Compensation Act Enforcement Rules Art. 2; UTATSU, supra note 332, at 34.
348
If the exculpatory clause doesn’t apply, the central government remains responsible for damages
in excess of ¥120 billion and assistance as required under Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 16(1). If
the exculpatory clause applies, the central government assumes primarily responsibility for relief and
necessary measures. Id. art. 17. Scholars have suggested that operator liability based on tort principles
remains a possibility. Tadashi Otsuka, Kankyou Hou ni Okeru Hiyou Futan to Genshiryoku Songai
Baishou, Hokkaido University Presentation Materials 35 (Sept. 3, 2012). Presentation materials on file
with author.
349
UTATSU, supra note 332, at 33-35. Otsuka, supra note 348, at 32-33.
350
Reiji Yoshida, Probe poised to take Tepco to task, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 7, 2011; see also
Kazuaki Nagata, New atomic regulator launches, vowing no more disasters, THE JAPAN TIMES Sept. 20,
2012. Scholars have described March 11 as a “high-damage, high-probability event.” Ramseyer, Why
Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 457, 479, 484.
351
UTATSU, supra note 332, at 36. Following March 11, the Diet passed the Nuclear Energy
Damages Compensation Assistance Organization Act, with the organization funded by government and the
nine nuclear power plant operators and three related entities. In August 26, 2011, the Diet also passed the
“Special Law Concerning Environmental Pollution arising from the Release of Radiation from the Nuclear
Reactor Accident accompanying the 2011 March 11 Tohoku Region Pacific Ocean Earthquake.” See
Otsuka, supra note 348, at 59.
346
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damages. 352 Primary attempts at ordering, based on black letter law,
establish a complex statutory regime; its complexity matched only by the
complexity of the regulatory structure implementing it.
2.

Regulating Nuclear Energy

There are a hodge-podge of ministries, commissions, and agencies
that have regulated the nuclear industry in Japan.353 As shown in the chart in
Appendix A, the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (“METI”), the
Ministry of Education, Science, Technology, and Sports (“MEXT”), and
their predecessors, along with affiliated entities and the Cabinet Office all
played central roles up until September 2012.354
Safety regulation of commercial reactors started with the Resource
Energy Division at the former Ministry of International Trade and
Industry.355 In 2001, as part of broader administrative restructuring, METI
was created and along with it the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(“NISA”), an external bureau staffed with approximately 300 employees,
affiliated with METI’s Resource Energy Division. 356 Prior to September
2012, METI held principal responsibility for the regulation of commercial
nuclear reactors in Japan, as well as responsibility for promoting nuclear
energy.357 Pursuant to a grant of authority in METI’s Establishment Law,
NISA conducted the actual evaluation of construction applications,
construction licensing, pre-use and other inspections, and advised METI on
decisions relating to regulatory activities.358
352

HIROSE, supra note 310, at 11.
Yuka Hayashi & Chester Dawson, Japanese Struggle with Shape of Nuclear Regulation, WALL ST.
J., March 25, 2012,(“[o]versight has also been fragmented”); Tatsujiro Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru
‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai—Beikoku Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai wo Sōzai Toshite, 4 SHAKAI
GIJUTSU KENKYŪ RONBUSHU 161, 167 (Dec. 2006).
354
The June 20, 2012 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act created an independent
regulatory commission designed to streamline, and improve, regulation. Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai Secchi
Hō [Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act], Law No. 47 of 2012 Hōrei teikyō de-ta
shisutemu [Hōrei DB]), available at, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
355
The Nuclear Energy Policy Section for the Electricity and Gas Division oversaw public relations,
research, safety, international cooperation, disposal, investigations, and technology related to nuclear
energy. Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 161,
166.
356
Id. at 167; Research Organization for Information, Science and Technology (“RIST”), Hatsudenyō
Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō (11-02-01-01) at 1, available at http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/
dat_detail.php?Title_Key=11-02-01-01 [hereinafter RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no
Gaiyō]; Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi,
supra note 310, at II-5.
357
Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at
II-5.
358
Id.; RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 1.
353
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In 2003, as part of efforts to ensure independence from the nuclear
industry, the Japanese government established the Japan Nuclear Energy
Safety Organization (“JNES”), a public corporation tasked with developing
independent technical expertise with which to analyze and evaluate the
safety of commercial nuclear power generators. 359
Staffed with
approximately 400 employees, JNES worked with NISA to provide expertise
relating to safety standards and inspections. It also directly conducted
inspections of some nuclear facilities.360
Prior to September 2012, MEXT regulated experimental and research
nuclear facilities, and it provided general environmental and radiation
monitoring for all facilities. 361 The Regulation Act provided for MEXT
oversight over experimental reactors and fuels and tasked MEXT with
ensuring compliance with international obligations. 362 The Response Act
outlined MEXT’s role in responding to nuclear accidents, and the Radiation
Injury Prevention Act authorized MEXT to implement regulations relating to
the release of radioactive materials. 363 The Science & Technology,
Academic Policy & Safety Division within MEXT maintained separate
offices dealing with radiation regulation; nuclear regulation; environmental
accident response; compensation measures, and international nuclear safety
issues.364
At the same time, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (“JAEC”)
and the Nuclear Safety Commission (“NSC”) operated as independent
commissions within the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. 365 Since its
inception in 1956, the JAEC has been tasked with establishing national
policy “for the promotion of research, development, and utilization of

359

Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 161,

167.
360

Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at
II-3; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 17; Tatsujiro Suzuki et al., Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei ni Okeru Dai Sansha
Kikan no Yakuwari, 2 SHAKAI GIJUTSU KENKYUU RONBUNSHUU 275, 276 (Oct. 2004); Suzuki et al., Anzen
Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 166-167. JNES performed safety
inspections and evaluations formerly entrusted to the Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation
(Genshiryoku Hatsuden Gijutsu Kikou). Id.
361
Mombukagakusho [MEXT], Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen ni Kansuru Soshiki Ni Tsuite,
available at, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuko/anzenkakuho/1260978.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2011).
362
Id.
363
Id.
364
Id.
365
Genshiryoku Iinkai Oyobi Genshiryoku Anzen Innkai Setchi Hō [Atomic Energy Commission and
Nuclear Safety Commission Establishment Law] Law No. 188 of 1955, art. 1, Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu
[Hōrei DB], available at, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
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nuclear energy.”366 In 1974, following a radiation leak on the nuclear vessel
Mutsu, the Prime Minister’s Office, moved safety regulation from the JAEC
to a newly established division in the Science and Technology Agency, and
then, in 1978, to the newly established NSC.367
As part of the 2001 administrative restructuring, the NSC became an
independent office within the Cabinet Office.368 The purpose of the NSC
was to provide a “double check”: the NSC was tasked with third party
oversight of all the other agencies regulating nuclear power, as well as
oversight over the nuclear power industry itself. 369 The NSC provided
secondary evaluations of construction and operation applications for nuclear
facilities and conducted secondary inspections.370 Separate sections within
the commission investigated and established nuclear safety engineering
standards; conducted “special investigations,” including investigating
litigated claims; conducted nuclear safety inspections for commercial
reactors, including planning and construction inspections; conducted
“regular” inspections; and engaged in rule-making activities.371 The NSC
could issue recommendations or warnings (kankoku) via the Prime
Minister’s Office, and the Prime Minister was to “respect” the decisions of
the NSC.372

366

Japan Atomic Energy Commission, The Mission, available at http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/i
ndex_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); Email correspondence with JAEC official (Jan. 10, 2013), on file
with author. Japanese law was silent with regard to nuclear security. The JAEC, on its own initiative,
established an advisory committee on nuclear security and published basic policies regarding the subject.
Id. The law is not silent with regard to its goal to develop nuclear energy. The Japan Atomic Energy
Agency Establishment Act specifies that part of the JAEC’s mission is to develop a Fast Breeder Reactor
and nuclear fuel cycle. Id.
367
Kokka Senryaku Shitsu, Genshiryoku Iinkai no Koremade no Katsudō to Keii (1950 Nendai Genzai) at 6; summary of document available at, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/info/committee/kihonmond
ai/33th/33-3.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012); Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai
teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 161, 165-166.
368
Id.
369
Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at
II-5.
370
Id. A former secretariat of the NSC suggests the NSC played four roles: 1) to act as a “doublecheck” on the examinations conducted by the regulatory agency in issuing construction permits; 2) to
establish basic safety inspection standards; 3) to “check” the regulatory activity of the government agencies
regulating nuclear power generators; and 4) to respond to nuclear emergencies. HIROSE, supra note 310, at
10.
371
Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 165166. The NSC issued its first warning or recommendation in 2002, through the Prime Minister to METI
relating to TEPCO. Id. at 166. METI, in turn, issued warnings to TEPCO relating to problems with
TEPCO’s inspections of its nuclear reactors. See METI Natural Resources Division, Heisei 15 Nendo Jūyō
Jikō, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2004/html/160g0020.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
372
Id.
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After March 11, criticism led to reform. 373 Government officials
announced plans for creation of a “highly independent” nuclear regulatory
commission to replace NISA. 374 The stated goal was to remove safety
regulation from METI, the ministry in charge of promoting use of atomic
energy, and to unify the major regulatory functions conducted by NISA and
METI, the NSC, JAEC and MEXT into one regulatory body. 375 After
months of disagreement regarding the authority and structure of the new
agency, on June 20, 2012, the Diet passed the Nuclear Regulatory Authority
[NRA] Establishment Act. 376 The new five-member commission is
structured, as shown in Appendix A, to have “legally guaranteed
independence,” with commission members appointed by the Diet.377 They
will operate as an Article 3 Commission, affiliated with the Ministry of the
Environment, and oversee approximately 500 regulators with limited ability
to transfer to other agencies or industry.378
The new regulatory commission began work September 2012,
following continued disagreement in the Diet and recess appointments of the
commissioners by the Prime Minister. 379 The new regulatory structure is
stream-lined compared to before, but it remains part of a complex structure
that engages in detailed, primary ordering. The basic regulatory framework
for inspecting and licensing commercial nuclear reactors, for now, remains
the same with the NRA assuming the roles played by NISA and the NSC.380

373

Debate highlighted the regulators’ ineffective oversight and slow response to the Fukushima crisis.
See, e.g., Human error amplified crisis: Amano, THE JAPAN TIMES, March 12, 2012; Kazuaki Nagata,
Further restarts hinge on new watchdog, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 17, 2012.
374
IAEA to get report on plan for better regulatory system, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011; New
Nuke safety bodies get OK, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 15, 2012.
375
“METI bureaucrats are reassigned every few years, mainly based on seniority, and often shuttle[d]
between the nuclear promotion and regulation sections.” Kazuaki Nagata, Nuke watchdog a ‘cosmetic
change’, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012; Cabinet OKs new nuke watchdog, THE JAPAN TIMES Aug. 16,
2011; Yuka Hayashi & Chester Dawson, supra note 353; Kazuaki Nagata, Further restarts hinge on new
watchdog, supra note 376.
376
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act, supra note 354.
377
Cabinet OKs new nuke watchdog, supra note 375; Kazuaki Nagata, supra note 373; Genshiryoku
Kiseicho
Hatsu
Daichoukan
ni
Zen
Keishi
Soukan,
NHK
(Sept.
12,
2012),
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20120912/k10014964801000.html; Kazuaki Nagata, supra note 351.
378
Kazuaki Nagata, supra note 350; Cabinet Secretariat, Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai Secchi Houan no
Gaiyou, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/info/seiritsu.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
379
Kazuaki Nagata, Further restarts hinge on new watchdog, supra note 373; Seifu, Genshiryoku
Kisei Iinkai wo 19 Nichi Hassoku, Iinchoura Shushoo Kengen de Ninmei, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (Sept.
11, 2012), http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS11002_R10C12A9MM0000/. Diet members were
unable to reach agreement on who should be appointed to the new commission. Id.
380
See Regulation Act, supra note 314 (Law No. 47 of June 27, 2012 Supplementary Provisions);
Two of Japan’s nuclear safety bodies fade into the sunset, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012.

JUNE 2013

3.

ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN

651

Licensing and Inspecting Nuclear Power Plants

Regulation starts with oversight of inspections conducted by the
nuclear power plant operators. 381 NISA, pursuant to a grant of authority
from METI, required each nuclear facility to develop and implement a
maintenance (hozen) program 382 and each operator to undertake “safety
management inspections,” including pre-use safety management inspections,
welding safety management inspections, and regularly scheduled safety
management inspections.383 NISA and the NSC then conducted inspections
of the inspections or inspected the facilities independently. 384 The NRA now
completes the inspections.
Separate safety regulatory schemes exist for commercial,
experimental, and research nuclear reactors.385 With commercial reactors,
inspections are divided into four stages, with regulatory examinations or
inspections occurring at the 1) planning and design stage; 2) construction
stage; 3) operational stage; and 4) decommissioning.386 Violations of safety
standards at any stage may result in administrative penalties, including
prison sentences of up to a year and fines of up to ten million yen;
suspension of an operating license for up to one year; or revocation of the
license.387
Pursuant to the Regulation Act, power plant operators must receive
the approval of the METI Minister, now the NRA, to construct a new
nuclear reactor. 388 Power companies begin the process by picking a
site,389which requires an environmental assessment prepared pursuant to the
381

HIROSE, supra note 310, at 14.
Id.
383
Id. METI, pursuant to the Regulation Act, licensed establishment plans and construction methods,
pre-use inspection, welding methods, safety measures, regular inspections, operating plans, safety
compliance, and oversight inspections of operations management supervision. Pursuant to the Electricity
Businesses Act, METI licensed construction plans, pre-use inspections, welding inspections, safety rules
filings, regular inspections. RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 1.
384
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 15.
385
Id. at 33, 62, 71.
386
Id. at 31. MEXT retained authority to regulate the safety of all experimental and research reactors.
Their review process, with the exception of the planning stage is similar to that for commercial reactors.
RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa (11-01-01-04), available at
http://www.rist.or.jp/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi
(Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa]. See also MEXT, Genshirō no Secchi, Unten, Nado, available at
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/genshiro_anzenkisei/1260755.htm.
387
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 32; Regulation Act, supra note 314, at arts. 177-184.
388
Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 23(1). Article 24 provides the standard for approval, and
Article 26 filing and approval standards for changes. Id. See also Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no
Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-2; HIROSE, supra note 310,
at 34, 36.
389
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 464.
382
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Environmental Assessment Act and Energy Enterprises Act. 390 With the
application, the plant operator must submit basic construction plans, with
regulators examining whether those plans meet the standards set out in the
Regulation Act. 391 Prior to September 2012, approval was based on a
preliminary evaluation of the application by NISA, followed by a secondary
evaluation and an opinion letter offered by the NSC. NISA examined
whether the submitted materials met licensing standards, including whether
they presented any structural problems that would interfere with accident
prevention. 392 NISA would also solicit the opinion of the JAEC regarding
security measures; use consistent with Japan’s long-term plan for nuclear
energy; and the financial health of the prospective licensee. 393 The NSC
opined on construction, technical ability to operate the plant, and disaster
prevention measures, including ability to withstand an earthquake.394 The
METI minister was required to "duly respect" the opinion of the NSC.395
After September 2012, the NRA decides.396
390

METI would solicit the opinion of the local governors during this process, make recommendations
as necessary, and “take all available measures to protect the environment.” They would hold public
hearings in order to “obtain the understanding” of local citizens, and, following the hearings, meet with
heads of related ministries then develop a Basic Energy Development Plan and designate the area as an
Important Electricity Development District. RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra
note 356, at 2; RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa, supra note 386.
391
Regulation Act, supra note 314, art. 24. RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni
Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa (11-01-01-04), supra note 389.
392
RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa, supra note 386.
393
Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 24; email correspondence with JAEC official, supra note
369. Following the September 2011 regulatory reforms, responsibility for use consistent with long-term
planning and ensuring the financial health of the licensee was transferred to the NRA. Id.
394
See Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 23(2). Review standards are set out in Article 24 of the
Regulation Act and in METI Technical Standards Ordinance No. 62. HIROSE, supra note 310, at 36.
Secondary examinations by the NSC made use of advisory committees, such as the Nuclear Reactor Safety
Specialist Committee, which focused on differences from earlier designs, new technical standards and
research data, special attributes of the proposed location, and technical ability to safely operate the facility.
Earthquake resistance standards are set out in the NSC’s Examination Guidelines for Earthquake
Resistance Design for Electricity Producing Nuclear Reactor Facilities (Hatsudenyou Genshiro Shisetsu ni
Kansuru Taishin Sekkei Shinsa Shishin) (Sept. 2006). See Hirose, supra note 310, at 18. See also Kantei,
Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-2.
Genshiryoku Anzen Iinkai, Hatsuden you Genshiryou Shisetsu ni Kansuru Taishin Sekkei Shinsa Shishin
(2006), available at http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/shinsashishin/pdf/1/si004.pdf.
395
RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa, supra note 386. The
METI minister would also request an opinion letter from the AEC. Id.
396
Regulation Act Article 24 continues to require the NRA solicit the opinion of the JAEC regarding
peaceful use in processing a license application. Email correspondence with JAEC official, supra note 369.
With regard to any use at all, in 2012 Japan announced a new energy policy phasing out nuclear energy,
and then backtracked. One government official described “zero-nuclear status” as “an ambition, not a
commitment.” The METI Minister then committed to construction of new, previously approved reactors,
and, more recently, the new Abe Cabinet has suggested that it will permit construction of new reactors.
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan’s New Leader Endorses Nuclear Plants, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A8; Masami
Ito, Abe Cabinet signals big changes ahead, THE JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 28, 2012; Mitsuru Obe, Japan to
Reconsider Nuclear Phaseout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012; Takashi Mochizuki et al., Japan Seeks Slow
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Following approval and prior to construction, the power company
must, pursuant to the Electricity Act, have its construction plan approved,
and file an Electricity Notice of Change.397 Design and construction plan
specifics must comply with both Regulation Act standards and Electricity
Act standards, including pre-approval of design plans relating to fuel.398
During the construction process, the Electricity Act requires that the
plant pass multiple “pre-use” inspections.399 They include on-site and offsite pre-use safety inspections, regular inspections, regular safety
inspections, and safety rules compliance inspections.400 The Electricity Act
provides for separate inspections covering welding and fuel. 401 It also
requires “Pre-Use Safety Management Inspections” by the power company:
internal inspections intended to determine compliance with construction
plans and technical standards.402 Regulators evaluate the method, process,
and results of these internal inspections.403
The Regulation Act requires the operator to establish approved,
internal safety rules prior to operation.404 The Regulation Act also requires
Nuclear Phase-Out, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2012; New reactor projects still on: Edano, THE JAPAN TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2012.
397
Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at
II-2; Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 330, at art. 9; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 34-35. The Notice of
Change Filing requirements are set out in the Electricity Businesses Act at Article 9. Article 47(1) provides
for the promulgation of technical standards. Hatsudenyou Genshiryoku Setsubi ni Kansuru Gijutsu Kijun
of Sadameru Shōrei [Ordinance Establishing Technical Standards Relating to the Establishment of
Commercial Nuclear Reactors], MITI Ordinance No. 62 (June 15, 1965), Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu
[Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
398
Id.; see also Electricity Businesses Act supra note 327, at art. 9, 47. RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō
no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 3. Standards for licensing include a determination that 1) there
is no risk the nuclear reactor will be used for anything other than peaceful purposes; 2) there is no risk that
this license will threaten the planned development and use of nuclear energy; 3) there is a sufficient
economic and technical base to construct the nuclear reactor and sufficient technical ability to operate it;
and 4) there are no problems with accident prevention measures with the proposed reactor, reactor location,
construction, facility, or fuel. RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 2.
399
Electricity Businesses Act supra note 327, at art. 49(1) requires “Pre-use Inspections” by METI
based on standards set out in METI ordinances. HIROSE, supra note 310, at 36-42. Kantei, Jikomae no
Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-3.
400
RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 3.
401
Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at arts. 51-2. Fuel inspections cover fuel design,
processing, transportation, and handling. Id. at 51(1)(3); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 38; Kantei, Jikomae no
Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-3.
402
Id.; Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 50-2.
403
HIROSE, supra note 310 at 38; Research Org. for Info., Sci. and Tech., Hatsudenyō Genshirō no
Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 4. Similar inspections for research reactors are made pursuant the
Reactor Regulation Law; The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry evaluates the company’s process,
methods, and schedules for conducting these inspections and inspection results, pursuant to Electricity Act
Art. 50(2). Research Org. for Info. Sci. and Tech., Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra
note 356, at 3.
404
Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 37(1); Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 42.
See also HIROSE, supra note 310, at 39-41. Prior to September 2012, operators filed their internal
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designation of a safety officer for the reactor, a “Primary Reactor
Technician,” and filing of that designation. 405 The Regulation Act then
requires creation and approval of internal Nuclear Materials Security
Rules, 406 notice filing of a “Nuclear Materials Security Management
Officer,”407 as well as filing of a Notice of Use of Internationally Regulated
Materials.408
The Regulation Act requires submission of operating plans.409 Once
started, the operator is then subject to regularly scheduled safety
inspections. 410 NISA, now the NRA, inspects the facility’s maintenance
program; conducts regularly scheduled inspections; regularly scheduled
inspections of the operator’s internal safety management program; and
inspections based on the facility’s age.411 Regulatory inspections depend on
the facility but are to be conducted not more than thirteen or eighteen
months since the last regularly scheduled inspection.412 There are also fixed
ten-year safety reviews, and additional evaluations of the facility prior to its
operation beyond a thirty-year period.413
The Regulation Act provides authority for on-site office and plant
inspections, including document requests and record and equipment
inspections; operator interviews and questioning of relevant persons; and
confiscation for examination or testing of nuclear and other materials. 414
The Electricity Act also establishes a framework for “regularly scheduled
inspections.”415 Enforcement regulations provide the details: they allow the
government inspections to be conducted on-site by government regulators
regulations with METI for approval by the METI minister. Now their internal regulations are filed with and
reviewed by the NRA. The Commercial Power Generating Reactor Rules enumerate the subject matter for
the internal rules, and include provisions governing facility operations and management, inspections,
radiation management, security management, safety education, and quality management. HIROSE, supra
note 313, at 39.
405
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 41.
406
Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 43-2(1).
407
Id. at art. 43(3); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 41.
408
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 42.
409
Regulation Act, supra note 317, at art. 30; HIROSE, supra note 313, at 42.
410
Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 357 at,
II-3.
411
Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 30; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 43.
412
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 48-49. The time frame depends on designation by the METI minister.
Id.
413
Id. at 15, 48. The life cycle of nuclear reactors is the subject of debate, with consideration of a
forty-year operational limit and exceptions to the limit. See New nuke safety bodies get OK, THE JAPAN
TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120615a2.html; NISA to let reactor run
beyond 40 years, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120607a3.html.
414
Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 68; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 51; Research Org. for Info.,
Sci., and Tech., Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 5.
415
Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 54; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 47, 49-50.
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accompanying operator employees during their regularly scheduled
inspection(s) or by conducting a record review of the operator’s regularly
scheduled inspections.416
Apart from government inspections, the Electricity Act provides for
“regularly scheduled safety management inspections” by the operator
requiring inspection, recording, and preservation of items designated by
ordinance.417 As with the pre-use inspections, the act provides for agency
review of these internal inspections, covering both the process and
methodology for the inspections, as well as the inspection results. 418
Separately an “Integrity Evaluation System” (kenzensei hyōka seido)
requires the operators to confirm compliance with all current technical
standards during both regularly scheduled inspections and operator
inspections.419
Apart from these inspections, the Regulation Act mandates “Safety
Inspections” (hōan kensa) at least four times a year, which include review of
operator compliance with both internal safety and security regulations. 420
Finally, the Regulation Act provides for Nuclear Materials Security
Inspections, as well as a separate Security Measures Inspections by
MEXT.421
In short, primary ordering starts with the basic laws. They organize
the regulators and establish a detailed licensing and inspection program. At
each stage, black letter law provides a complex, detailed scheme for
determining where and when a nuclear reactor operates.
B.

Courts and Nuclear Energy

Whether a nuclear power plant runs, however, depends not only on the
regulators and these inspections but also on the judicial process. Groups of
individuals living near nuclear reactors have repeatedly filed administrative
lawsuits seeking revocation of operating licenses, as well as civil lawsuits
seeking injunctions against the operation of nuclear plants.422
416

Electricity Businesses Act Enforcement Regulations art. 90(2); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 47.
Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 55; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 47, 49-50; RIST,
Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 4.
418
Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 55(4); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 50.
419
Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at arts. 39 and 55; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 46.
420
These inspections must also occur after designated events, which include when starting and
stopping reactor, replacing fuel, or undertaking other specified operations involving cooling systems or
reactor container water levels. See Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 37(5); HIROSE, supra note 310, at
50; RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 5.
421
HIROSE, supra note 310, at 51.
422
Administrative litigation in Japan is a distinct subset of civil litigation, filed pursuant to the
Administrative Case Litigation Act. See, e.g., Narufumi Kadomatsu, Judicial Governance Through
417
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In 1973, plaintiffs filed suit against the government seeking
revocation of the establishment license for the Ikata Dai-ichi Nuclear Power
Plaint in Shikoku. 423 In 1975, about 400 plaintiffs brought a similar suit
seeking to shut down the Fukushima Dai-Ni Nuclear Power Plant. 424 In
1992, after years of expert testimony and appeals, the Supreme Court ruled
on both cases. 425 The court affirmed both licensing decisions, affording
broad technical discretion to the government in deciding whether to grant an
operating license.426
In the Ikata case, the Supreme Court held that there must be “mistakes
or omissions that are difficult to overlook” (kanka shigatai kago, ketsuraku)
in the investigation or decision-making process in order to find
“irrationality” and, hence, illegality in licensing the reactor. 427 In the
Fukushima case, the Supreme Court found it appropriate to limit inquiry to
issues relating to the safety of the basic design, and not review all of the
safety inspections required under the Regulation Act. 428 Within these
constraints, the Supreme Court found no “irrationality” in these cases, but it
did shift the burden of proof.429 It held that while the plaintiffs in principle
bear the burden of proof, given that the defendant agencies have all of the
relevant records, if the defendant fails to claim and prove rationality, the
court would adopt a factual inference that there was irrationality in the
agency’s decision. 430 The court afforded the government deference, after
review and shifting the burden of proof.431
The same year, the Supreme Court recognized standing for citizens
seeking to invalidate the operating license for the Monju Fast Breeder
Resolution of Legal Disputes?–A Japanese Perspective, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. R. 141, 145-152 (2009).
See also Professor Levin’s discussion of litigation under the act. Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities
and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform
Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419 (2001).
423
UTATSU, supra note 332, at 75; Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 Sho (gyō tsu) no. 133,
804 HANREI TAIMUZU 51 (Ikata).
424
UTATSU, supra note 332, at 74; Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992, Hei 2 (gyō tsu) no.
147, 804 HANREI TAIMUZU 65 (Fukushima); See also Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear
Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 468.
425
UTATSU, supra note 332, at 74-76.
426
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Ikata case), supra note 423; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
Apr. 10, 1992, (Fukushimia case), supra note 429.
427
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Ikata case), supra note 423, at 61.
428
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Fukushima case), supra note 424, at 68.
429
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Ikata case), supra note 423, at 61.
430
Id. Japanese courts shifted the burden of proof in the Minamata and other pollution cases in the
1970s. UPHAM, supra note 28, at 43-44. The do so now routinely in other áreas of the law. Yuka Kaneko,
A Procedural Approach to Judicial Reform in Asia, 23 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 313, 336 (2010); Ramseyer,
The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims, supra note 24, at 675 & no. 52.
431
UTATSU, supra note 332, at 75-76.

JUNE 2013

ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN

657

Reactor in Fukui.432 After remand, a cooling system malfunctioned resulting
in a fire at the reactor and the government shutting it down.433 The district
court still found the plant safe; the Nagoya High Court did not.434 The high
court found that a high degree of care was required in safety examinations of
this next-generation commercial reactor, that the national government had
the burden of proving safety, and that both substantively and procedurally
the government’s safety inspections fell below the required level of care.
The court found the safety inspections of the reactor facility needed “to be
redone in their entirety” and voided the license.435 In 2005, the Supreme
Court overturned the injunction finding no “mistakes or omissions that are
difficult to overlook” and no “illegality” in the licensing process.436
Civil suits have fared no better. In 1999, a Sapporo District Court
decision reviewed plaintiffs’ demand for an injunction against the operation
of Hokkaido Tomari Nuclear Reactors Nos. 1 & 2. 437 The court rejected
plaintiffs’ claims, but it did recognize an “abstract risk of danger is always
present that nuclear power generation invites a result that cannot be
reversed.” 438 In a suit seeking to enjoin operation of the Shiga Nuclear
Power Plant No. 2, residents living around the plant argued that they were
subjected to a risk of radiation exposure beyond permissible levels, and the
Kanazawa District Court agreed: “in operating the nuclear reactors . . . the
plaintiffs are exposed to a concrete risk of injury to life, body, and health.”439
The court imposed on the national government and power company a burden
of proof of safety, and found, in this case, that the safety inspection
432

Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 22, 1992, Hei gan (gyō-tsu) no. 130, 801 HANREI TAIMZU 83,
91; UTATSU, supra note 335, at 75. Litigation started when local residents sued MITI to void the permit it
issued in 1983 to build the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor. The Fukui District Court dismissed their claim for
lack of standing; the Nagoya High Court granted standing to those nearest the plant; the Supreme Court
expanded standing and remanded in 1992. Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on
Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 470.
433
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 470.
434
Fukui Chisai [Fukui Dist. Ct.] Mar. 22, 2000, Hei 4 (gyō u) no. 6, 1043 HANREI TAIMUZU 122, 258
(Japan); reversed Nagoya Kōsai Kanazawa Shibu [Nagoya High Ct. Kanazawa Branch] Jan. 27, 2003, Hei
12 (gyō ko) no. 12, 1117 Hanrei Taimuzu 83, 210.
435
Nagoya High Ct. Kanazawa Branch, Jan. 27, 2003, supra note 439, at 210.
436
Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 30, 2005, Hei 15 (gyō-hi) no. 108, 1191 HANREI TAIMUZU 175,
179. Other suits seeking injunctions have reached a similar result. A Fukushima court dismissed a suit
seeking an injunction against use of plutonium enriched MOX at the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor, and
courts have found standing but dismissed on the merits cases involving reactors in Onagawa, Ehime, Tokaimura, Takahama, Tomari, and Kashiwazaki. See Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear
Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 469-470.
437
Sapporo Chisai [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 22, 1999, Sho 63 (wa) no. 2041, 1676 HANREI JIHŌ 3.
438
Id. Plaintiffs failed in a similar suit seeking to enjoin Hokuriku Shiga Nuclear Power Plant No. 1.
See Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 469.
439
Kanazawa Chisai [Kanazawa Dist. Ct.] Mar. 24, 2006, Hei 11 (wa) no. 430, 1277 HANREI
TAIMUZU 317, 372.
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standards were inadequate. 440 That court issued an injunction against
operation of the plant that was, again, short-lived. In March 2009, the
Nagoya High Court overturned the decision finding insufficient evidence of
a risk to the plaintiffs’ health and safety. 441 The Supreme Court declined to
hear the appeal and affirmed the high court in October 2010.442
Plaintiffs groups have also sued to block the sale of land for use as a
reactor, without success. 443 They have purchased stock in the power
companies and filed derivative suits opposing reactor operations, without
success.444 Plaintiffs have filed suits for money damages, without success.445
Following the Tokaimura accident, courts even found plaintiffs who did sue
had received larger provisional payments than warranted and ordered them
to repay JCO the excess.446
To date, private causes of action seeking revocation of operating
licenses in administrative suits and seeking injunctions prohibiting operation
in civil suits have all failed. But local residents continue to sue: local
residents have recently filed suit against the Japan Atomic Power Company
seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the restart of two reactors in its
Tsuruga nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture; 447 local residents have
again filed suit against Hokuriku Electric Power Company seeking to shutdown the two nuclear reactors at Shika.448 There are numerous Fukushimarelated suits, both civil and criminal, now pending.449
440

Id. at 326-27.
Nagoya Kousai [Nagoya High Ct.] Mar. 18, 2009, Hei 18 (ne) no. 108, 1307 HANREI TAIMUZU
187, 282.
442
In October 29, 2010, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal. See UTATSU, supra note 332, at 78.
443
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 471
-72.
444
Id. Following a cooling system malfunction, in 1989 local citizens contested operation of the
Fukushima Dai Ni reactors, through a shareholders suit. A Tokyo district and high court, deferred to
specialists who opined it safe to restart the reactor, and rejected the suit. Id. at 469.
445
Id. at 472-75; UTATSU, supra note 332, at 81-92.
446
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 475.
Thousands did receive compensation following the Tokai-mura incident. They did so through
administrative procedures established by the power companies, pursuant to guidelines established by the
Science and Technology Agency’s Atomic Energy Damage Investigation Committee. UTATSU, supra note
335, at 81-92.
447
Residents sue over Tsuruga reactors, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp
/news/2011/11/09/national/residents-sue-over-tsuruga-reactors/#.UTlkaBx_CSo.
448
Residents sue to scrap Shika nuke reactors, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 27, 2012),
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120627a8.html. In 2006 the Kanazawa District Court enjoined
operation of the No. 2 reactor at Shika, a decision overturned by the Nagoya High Court in 2009 and
Supreme Court in 2010. Id.
449
Fukushima-related suits include a criminal complaint filed by 1,300 people alleging criminal
negligence on the part of both TEPCO and government regulators and four civil “class-action” lawsuits
aggregating the claims of approximately 1650 plaintiffs, as, as well as individual actions. U.S. service
members participating in Operation Tomodachi have also filed suit in U.S. court claiming damages for
441

JUNE 2013

ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN

659

Even if a power company prevails in litigation, however, that still
does not mean its nuclear power plant will operate. It can meet all the
regulatory requirements, pass all the inspections, and win in court, but
another layer of norms still apply.
C.

“Gentlemen’s Agreements”

Authority for regulating the safety of the nuclear industry resides in
the central government; with the exception of periods during designated
nuclear disasters, no legal authority to regulate is provided to local
governments.450 But whether or not a nuclear power plant runs depends on a
“gentlemen’s agreement” (shinshi kyōtei) between the power company and
local governments.451
These gentlemen’s agreements exist outside of any regulatory
framework and without any legal basis.452 Prior to March 11, they were the
subject of criticism, with commentators lamenting that local governments
have, without a legal basis, “wielded a de facto right of refusal” to permit
plants built in their prefectures to operate.453 Others have complained that
this de facto requirement has become “a barrier to effective business
operations.”454
The agreements started with TEPCO’s agreement with the Fukushima
Prefectural government in 1969. 455 Similar agreements with other
prefectures, including Fukui, Shizuoka, and Ibaragi Prefectures, followed.456
The written basis for the “gentlemen’s agreement” is an agreement signed by
exposure resulting from TEPCO lying about the radiation risk. See 1,300 file complaints against TEPCO,
THE JAPAN TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/12/national/1300-filecomplaints-against-tepco/#.UTlnhhx_CSo; Family of nuke crisis suicide victim to sue TEPCO for damages,
THE JAPAN TIMES (May 10, 2012) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/10/national/family-of-nukecrisis-suicide-victim-to-sue-tepco-for-damages/#.UTlmnRx_CSo; Chico Harlan, Nuclear redress will never
approximate losses, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/27/nati
onal/nuclear-redress-will-never-approximate-losses/#.UTllqRx_CSo; Government, Tepco sued over fallout,
THE JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/12/national/governmenttepco-sued-over-fallout/#.UXL7qbWG3pU; Eight U.S. sailors sue Tepco for millions for falsely
downplaying Fukushima radiation exposure, THE JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121228a3.html.
450
Shin-etsu Sugawara, et al., Genshiryoku Anzen Kyōtei wo Meguru Hito Kōsatsu [A Study on the
Nuclear Safety Agreements Compared with the Pollution Control Agreements], 10 NIHON GENSHIRYOKU
GAKKAI WABUN RONBUNSHU 119 (2011).
451
Genpatsu no Saikidou tte Dō Iu Koto?, ASAHI SHINBUN (July 5, 2011), at 2.
452
Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 119. Local governments have been criticized, as a result, for
“excessive involvement” leading to opaqueness in the regulatory process. Id.
453
Id. at 119, 121.
454
Id. Where praised, they have been characterized as augmenting deficiencies in governmental
regulation. Id.
455
Id.
456
Id.
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the power company with the local prefecture and city government where the
plant is to be located.457
A 2005 agreement entered into by the Fukui Prefectural Government,
local governments, and the companies operating the five nuclear power
plants in Fukui provides one example.458 It is full of “must endeavor to”
language.459 It states that the agreement’s purpose is to “preserve the safety
of the surrounding environment and the workers at the power generation
plant.” 460 In order to accomplish this, Article 1 sets out that the power
company and local governments are to “function as one.” 461 The power
company “in order to preserve the safety of the surrounding environment
and the power plant workers, must take every measure possible.”462
This includes observing all related laws and performing “in good
faith” the obligations of the agreement.463 According to the agreement, the
power company must, among other things, pro-actively develop quality
control measures and strengthen risk management systems; develop new
technologies and improve existing systems; thoroughly educate, train, and
supervise both employees and contractors working at the facility; develop
comprehensive nuclear accident plans and protective measures against
nuclear emergencies; and develop environmental protection measures.464
Other terms are more concrete. The power company must obtain the
agreement of the local governments prior to the construction of new
facilities and prior to significantly altering existing plans.465 It must contact
local governments in advance of new fuel or spent fuel shipments.466 It must
communicate information regarding construction, operating conditions,
environmental radiation measurements, and reactor surveys.467 The power
company must immediately contact the local government in the event of an
emergency; operation of emergency cooling measures; leakage of
radioactive substances; unplanned stoppages and malfunctions; radiation
457

Fukui Agreement (May 16, 2005) on file with author.
Id.; Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 119, 124.
459
“The direction to ‘endeavor’ or make best efforts…is not uncommon in Japanese legislation
“where a gentle touch is desired.” Mark A. Levin, Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on
Instrumental and Judicial Administration in Japan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 265, 303 n. 164 (2011).
460
Fukui Agreement Preamble, supra note 462.
461
Id. art. 1.
462
Id. art. 2.
463
Id. art. 2(2).
464
Id. arts. 2(3) & 4. Other “musts” include strengthening measures relating to aging facilities;
sharing information with sub-contractors and product manufacturers; developing measures to ensure the
safety of the workers, reduction of radiation exposure, and reduction of radioactive waste.
465
Id. at art. 3. See also Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 125.
466
Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, at art. 5.
467
Id. art. 6.
458
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poisoning of workers beyond established standards; other injury; or other
similar events.468 Local governments retain the right to demand reports from
the power company and conduct on-site inspections of the facility. 469
Representatives of the local community may accompany central government
regulators on inspections if there is a risk to the health of local residents.470
The agreement provides that local governments may demand
stoppage, limited use, or improvements to the reactors where, based on
previous reports or an on-site inspection, additional safety measures are
determined necessary; special measures are necessary to prevent the release
of radiation following an accident or emergency; or special measures are
determined necessary following review of accidents at other nuclear power
generating facilities. 471 The agreement also provides for an “agreement
regarding resumption of operations” 472 if operations at a reactor are
terminated pursuant to one of the above conditions, or if operations are
terminated following an accident resulting in the formation of a special
investigation committee by the national government.473
The requirement of local government approval for operation has been
interpreted broadly. 474 While the agreements concluded with local
governments require only that the power company report to the local
government regarding regularly scheduled inspections, the power companies
in practice explain the results of inspections and seek the approval of the
local governments prior to restarting a reactor. 475 There is no legal
requirement to do so, but there is the reality that future approval for
additional construction or substantial changes in operations, which are
covered by the agreement, would be difficult to obtain absent cooperation at
other times.476
468

Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8. See also Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 125. The Fukui Prefectural Government
conducted one such onsite inspection following an incident in August 2004 at Bihama Nuclear Power
Station. Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 125.
470
Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, art. 9. See also Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 125.
471
Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, at art. 10.
472
Id. art. 11.
473
Id.
474
Teiki Kensa ga Owattemo Jimoto no Rikai ga Fukaketsu Da Yo, ASAHI SHINBUN (July 5, 2011) at
2.
475
Id. This right of refusal has also been applied by analogy to incidents resulting in an unscheduled
shutdown of a reactor. Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 119, 126.
476
Teiki Kensa ga Owattemo Jimoto no Rikai ga Fukaketsu Da Yo, supra note 474, at 2. The power
company goes on to agree to compensate local residents “in good faith” and immediately undertake
measures to prevent further damage if damage has been caused as a result of operation of the power plant.
Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, at art. 12. The power company agrees to engage in thorough education
and training as well as develop clear and speedy communication networks as part of strengthening its
nuclear accident response measures. Id. at art. 13. The company must inform the local governments of any
469
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Even before March 11, commentators noted an increase in local
government intervention. 477 The agreements have frequently resulted in
separate examinations by prefectural governments apart from the statutory
inspection process, with approval decisions based on undisclosed criteria
made by the local heads of government, at times long after completion of the
central government’s regulatory inspections.478
The result has been a variety of standards applied by local
governments to reactor construction and re-starts.479 In May 2010, prior to
the restart of the Monju Fast Breeder reactor, local governments demanded
not only additional safety measures but also additional regional
“revitalization efforts” by the central government as a condition for
restarting the reactor.480 Some argue local governments have held nuclear
plants hostage in exchange for more economic aid. Others suggest that the
local governments seek to incorporate “societal considerations” into the
approval process.481
Regardless of the motives, local governments have the final say. 482
But even that statement is shroud in ambiguity. As Japan debated the re-start
of its nuclear reactors following March 11, national officials affirmed that
“local consent” is necessary, but there was no consensus about what
constituted local—whether local consent is limited to the town and

special press conferences or releases regarding the power plant. Id. at art. 14. The company agrees to
respond in writing and on local government forms to information requested. Id. at arts. 3, 5, and 6. Both
parties are to designate a contact person to facilitate communications. Id. at arts. 15 & 16. The parties also
agree that either party may propose revisions to the agreement if the need arises; both parties agree to
“negotiate in good faith regarding revisions to the agreement”; to negotiate and set out any additional
necessary details in a separate memorandum; to negotiate regarding concerns arising relating to provisions
in the agreement or matters not addressed therein. Id. at arts. 17-19..
477
Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 119, 129.
478
Id. at 124-25.
479
Id. at 126.
480
Id. 126.
481
Id. at 124.
482
Mayor OKs Genkai Plant Reactor Restart, THE JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.japantime
s.co.jp/news/2011/11/02/national/mayor-oks-genkai-plant-reactor-restart/#.UWXjZhmHzoc. The mayor of
the town “effectively approved Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s plan to restart a nuclear reactor halted due to
human error.” Id. Communities throughout Japan have refused to allow reactors to restart following
routine maintenance. Yuka Hayashi et al., Japan Premier Pushes Nuclear-Plant Restarts, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904194604576582240847767666.html.
“Under Japanese law, local governments have no power to dictate the operation of nuclear power plants.
But all of Japan’s nine regional utilities that own and operate nuclear plants have safety agreements with
hosting municipal and prefectural governments in which those authorities are given some say in plant
operations.” Mari Iwata & Eleanor Warnock, Tokyo Clears 2 Reactors for Restart, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577341591983335470.html.
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prefecture in which the reactor is located, or extends to surrounding towns
and prefectures that might be affected by the plant’s operation.483
In seeking to restart the Oi reactors in Fukui Prefecture following
March 11, the central government first assumed the former, but, in the face
of opposition from surrounding towns and prefectures, it attempted to
persuade officials from the surrounding areas.484 The METI Minister opined
that local consent should not be decided “mechanically and numerically” but
“comprehensively”
and
“based
on
political
judgments
and
485
responsibilities.”
The search for “local consent” split local residents in Oi. Critics of
nuclear power pointed to continued safety concerns and supporters pointed
to employment and related tax revenue that provided up to sixty percent of
the town’s budget. 486 In the end, economics won out. 487 The central
government approved the re-start of the Oi reactors, and requested local
consent. 488 The Oi municipal assembly reviewed, at the mayor’s request,
whether to restart the reactors and endorsed doing so.489 They were followed
by the seven-prefecture and two-city Union of Kansai Governments, which
ultimately deferred to the central government.490 The local nuclear reactor
483

Fukutaro Yamashita, Meaning of ‘local’ authority unclear, THE DAILY YOMIURI, March 15, 2012,

at 3.
484

Noda’s reactor restart scenario thwarted, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 8, 2012, http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2012/05/08/national/nodas-reactor-restart-scenario-thwarted/#.UWZH_RmHzoc. Some
commentators suggested that regulations governing evacuation areas should be used as a guidepost to
determine local consent, but recent changes expanding evacuation areas from ten kilometers to thirty
kilometers significantly increased the number of local governments from which consent would be required.
Confusion over ‘local entities’, THE DAILY YOMIURI, March 25, 2012, at 2.
485
Yamashita, Meaning of ‘local’ authority unclear, supra note 488, at 3; Confusion over ‘local
entities’, supra note 483, at 2.
486
Akiyoshi Hatamoto & Noriko Hara, Local Communities Await Decision on Reactors, THE DAILY
YOMIURI, March 15, 2012, at 3. Martin Fackler, Japan’s Premier Seeks Support for Using Nuclear Power,
N. Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/japans-prime-minister-seekspublic-support-for-nuclear-energy.html?_r=0. “Reactors bring massive subsidies, jobs, and tax revenue.”
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 464. A 2004
METI pamphlet promises over ¥39 billion in subsidies during the ten years from the initial environmental
impact statement to operation and over ¥50 billion in subsidies and revenue during the first ten years of
operation. Id. at 465.
487
Eric Johnston, Official Kansai’s Reactor Nod Puzzles, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 7, 2012,
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120607a5.html; Fackler, supra note 486.
488
Oi Assembly Says Yes to Restarting Reactors, THE JAPAN TIMES (May 15, 2012),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/15/national/oi-assembly-says-yes-to-restartingreactors/#.UWeX4RlAutR; Pushing Back, Fukui Governor Calls for Clear Nuclear Policy, THE JAPAN
TIMES, May 16, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/16/national/pushing-back-fukuigovernor-calls-for-clear-nuclear-policy/#.UWe6lBlAutQ.
489
Oi assembly says yes to restarting reactors, supra note 488.
490
Kansai governor; Oi reactors restart is state’s call, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2012,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/31/national/kansai-governors-oi-reactors-restart-is-statescall/#.UWeY9xlAutQ,); Fukui governor asks why Oi reactors should be restarted, THE JAPAN TIMES, June
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safety commission affiliated with the Fukui Prefectural government then
approved the restart. 491 The governor of Fukui prefecture then gave his
approval, and transmitted it to the central government along with a request
for greater safety measures, training, and research.492 Final approval by the
central government followed.493 In short, regardless of all the law defining
when a reactor can operate, the central government sought and obtained the
consent of local governments, broadly defined, before restarting the
reactors.494
D.

Law and Nuclear Energy Conclusion

There is an elaborate regulatory structure governing operation of
nuclear power plants in Japan—law and regulation everywhere you look.
But when it comes time to flip the switch, that law and the process it dictates
takes a backseat to a “gentlemen’s agreement.” The result is local
government applying an undefined standard of review and consensus
determining whether or not a nuclear reactor should operate.
March 11 and its aftermath demonstrate that both layers of the law,
formal and informal, failed. The point here is to understand that there are
multiple layers of norms governing the process. Concrete rights and
obligations have not replaced Professor Kawashima’s rights that “exist but
don’t exist.”495 Detailed norms now operate in conjunction with gentlemen’s
agreements and “rights that exist but don’t exist.”
This layering of formal and informal norms is echoed in TEPCO’s
post-March 11 application for assistance from the government. On May 10,
2011, pursuant to Article 16 of the Compensation Act, TEPCO submitted to
5, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/05/national/fukui-governor-asks-why-oi-reactorsshould-be-restarted/#.UWeZIhlAutQ.
491
Official Kansai’s Reactor Nod Puzzles, supra note 489; Local nuclear safety commission says Oi
reactors safe to restart, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 11, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/11/n
ational/local-nuclear-safety-commission-says-oi-reactors-safe-to-restart/#.UWeZ2hlAutQ.
492
Kazuaki Nagata, Reactors at Oi to be reactivated, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 17, 2012,
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120617a1.html,; Mitsuru Obe & Chester Dawson, Nuclear-Plant
Restart Highlights Split in Japan, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB300014240
52702303444204577460272545747302.html.
493
Nagata, Reactors at Oi to be reactivated, supra note 492; Nuclear-Plant Restart Highlights Split
in Japan, supra note 494.
494
Industry officials had urged the central government to move quickly, impliedly regardless of local
consent: “The final decision is up the government, or the prime minister . . . I would like to ask the prime
minister to make a bold decision quickly.” Edano Not for Restarting Oi Reactors Temporarily, THE JAPAN
TIMES, May 30, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/30/national/edano-not-for-restarting-oireactors-temporarily/#.UWe68RlAutQ. Decisions without obtaining consent remain a possibility when
informal norms apply.
495
See KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI supra note 1, at 93, 104, 116, 139, 151.
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the Japanese government a request for assistance.496 The request (onegai)
starts off with an apology and acceptance of responsibility:
As a result of the accident at this company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, for those living near the plant and for
society at large, the company has caused great concern and
inconvenience for which it sincerely apologizes. The company,
at this point, sincerely accepts the fact that it is the cause of
nuclear energy damage, and, from the perspective of realizing
prompt compensation to all those who suffered injury, will
provide compensation based on the Compensation Act….497
The request ends with a plea: “by all means, we humbly request
Japanese government assistance.”498
Note the language of entreaty, apology, and acceptance of
responsibility. It is not the language of contract or of rights and obligations.
It is not language made with an eye towards litigation. It is the type of
language found in Professor Kawashima’s discussion of superior and inferior
relationships.499 It is the type of language found in Tokugawa pleadings,
where government action was a benevolent grant not a right. 500 The
Compensation Act provides a formal legal structure to apply for government
assistance, but TEPCO’s application takes the form of an apology and a plea.
It is difficult to imagine a company facing similar liability in the U.S.
leading with an apology and lodging a humble plea for assistance with the
government. 501 It is easy to imagine that happening in Professor
496

Compensation Act, supra note 331, art. 16. The act states that “the government will provide
necessary assistance to the nuclear energy enterprise for that enterprise to pay compensation for damages
when damages have arisen from nuclear energy exceeding the liability for the nuclear energy enterprise to
provide compensation as set out in Article 3, and it is determined necessary to meet the aims of this Act.”
Id.
497
TEPCO, Genshiryoku Songai Baisho ni Kakawaru Kuni no Shien no Onegai (May 10, 2011),
available at http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/songaibaisho_110511.pdf. See also UTATSU,
supra note 332, at 36.
498
Id.
499
KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌSHIKI, supra note 1, at 103.
500
See, e.g., Dan Fenno Henderson, Nuinosuke v. Chūbē: Conciliation in Tokugawa Civil Trials,
reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES & COMMENTARY 1,13 (Milhaut et al., eds.,
2012); John O. Haley, Rivers and Rice: What Lawyers and Legal Historians Should Know About Medieval
Japan, 36 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 310, 347 (2010); Dan Fenno Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law,
27 WASH. L. REV. 83, 92-93, 100-102 (1952).
501
It is difficult to imagine a company operating in the U.S. repeating that apology after being named
as a defendant by thousands of injured plaintiffs. Tepco recently did just that. In a news conference it
stated “our safety, culture, skills, and ability were all insufficient…. We must humbly accept our failure to
prevent the accident, which we should have avoided by using our wisdom and resources to be better
prepared.” Mari Yamaguchi, Utility company shoulders blame for Japan nuclear crisis, BOSTON GLOBE,
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Kawashima’s Japan.502 Whether operation or compensation, regulation of
the nuclear power industry in Japan occurs on two levels: it starts with a
complex formal regulatory and compensatory scheme, and ends with
relationships and rights that “exist but don’t exist.”
V.

CONCLUSION

This article discusses three areas of the law and from that discussion
makes a broader argument about how law functions in Japan today. One
could ask if these areas are representative.
One could also look elsewhere. In commercial law, Japan now
provides thirty-nine different corporate forms to choose from.503 In contrast
to that complexity stands the Supreme Court’s 2010 enunciation of its
business judgment rule, which provides for review of process and substance:
“so long as there are no conspicuously unreasonable points in the decisionmaking process and substance, the board of directors will not be found to
have breached their duty of care.”504
One could look to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s 2011
ordinance targeting those who willingly or unwittingly do business with
organized crime. 505 Businesses now have a “duty to endeavor” (dōryoku
gimu) to include in all contracts language permitting termination, without
notice, if it is discovered that the other party is in some way affiliated with
organized crime. 506 Discovery of affiliation between any employee and a
member of organized crime now, at least in theory, provides grounds for
immediate termination of contracts for everything from leases to the supply
of vending machines.507 Landlords are refusing to rent apartments to and
Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/03/30/utility-company-shoulders-blamefor-japan-nuclear-crisis/3Pr80cDmbqI5KXhmqAL2wN/story.html.
502
See KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌSHIKI, supra notes 2-21.
503
JAPAN CORPORATION LAW GUIDE 54-56 (2009).
504
Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2010, Hei 21 (uke) no. 183, at 4, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ], http://www.courts.go.jp.
505
Tokyo Bōryokudan Haijo Jōrei [Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance on the Elimination of Organized
Crime], Ordinance of March 18, 2011, arts. 12-14, http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/sotai/
haijo_seitei.htm. See also Keishichō, Jōrei no Gaiyō, http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/sotai/haijo_seit
ei.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 20120).; Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jeff Bater, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Japan
Organized Crime, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020391830
4577241844134189560.html; Mark Schreiber, Anti-yakuza Laws Are Taking Their Toll, THE JAPAN TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/03/04/national/anti-yakuza-laws-are-taking-theirtoll/#.UWemfxlAutQ.
506
Jōrei no Gaiyō, supra note 505; Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance on the Elimination of Organized
Crime, supra note 511, art. 18.
507
E.g., Sept. 14, 2011 and Dec. 26, 2011 contracts on file with author. One of Japan’s most
successful talk show hosts was forced to resign from his management company following revelations of
past ties to a member of organized crime. See Wakabayashi & Bater, supra note 505.
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banks refusing to open bank accounts for those suspected of ties to
organized crime.508 Some driving schools now require their students’ pledge
“absolutely no ties to organized crime” before the school will certify their
attendance allowing them to apply for a driver’s license.509 The aim of the
ordinance is understandable; the means employed shows a willingness to
expand the law and contract’s reach into every corner of society.
In contrast stands the increasing use of prosecutorial discretion not to
prosecute. 510
Prosecution rates for general crimes declined from
approximately 45% in 2000 to 36.2% in 2010; prosecution rates for special
crimes declined during the same period from over 70% to 56.3%. 511
Criminal law now dictates the terms of routine contracts, but, at the same
time, the exercise of discretion within the criminal justice system has grown.
Rather than reviewing additional areas of the law, however, the
evidence warrants stepping back, and returning to Professor Kawashima’s
discussion of the role of law in Japan. Professor Kawashima described law
in Japan as like an heirloom sword, something to be displayed and admired
but not used. 512 Japanese law scholars have debated the validity of the
analogy since. 513 The discussion here suggests that a different debate is
necessary.
The law now fences off, in increasingly small parcels, much of the
landscape of Japanese society. Legal norms, including private ordering and
public laws, are readily visible and commonly invoked. While these fences
define the territory and provide the starting point in resolving disputes, if
challenged they often give way. They give way to secondary ordering that
occurs in the undefined spaces of equity. As a result, negotiation in Japan
often occurs not in the shadow of the law, but in the shadow of primary
attempts at ordering, and when negotiation fails, then based on notions of
fairness and consensus.
508

Schreiber, supra note 505.
Id.
510
Saikō Saibanshō, Keiji Tetsuzuki, http://www.courts.go.jp/saiban/syurui_keizi/keizi_01_02/index.ht
ml (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). Prosecutors may decide not to prosecute if there is insufficient evidence that
the suspect committed the crime or if there is sufficient evidence but, in light of considerations including
the suspect’s character, age and circumstances; the severity of the crime and any extenuating
circumstances; and the circumstances following commission of the crime, the prosecutor decides that it is
“not necessary” to prosecutor. Id. See also, Midori Daisuke, Kensatsukan no Sotsui Sairyō to Sono Genkai,
676 HŌGAKU SEMINA 141 (Apr. 2011); Masaki Yamamoto, Kensatsukan Seido to Kiso Sairyōken, in
NIHON KEIJIHŌ NO RIRON TO TENBŌ 85 (2002).
511
Keisatsusho, Heisei 22 Nendo Hannzai Hakusho, http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/57/nfm/n_57_2_2_2
_3_0.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Keisatsusho, Heisei 23 Nendo Hannzai Hakusho,
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/58/nfm/images/full/h2-2-3-02.jpg (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
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KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌSHIKI, supra note 1, at 47.
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See supra notes 19 to 31.
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A Japanese lease will detail liability for damaged shower hoses and
rubber stoppers, but, if challenged, a Japanese court will void a contractually
mandated rent increase when it doesn’t reflect current economic
circumstances. Employers routinely impose broad liability on their
employees and invoke detailed work rules that conflict with decades of
judicial decisions, but, if an employee pushes hard enough, the fence gives
way to judicial standards of “just cause.” Japan now seeks to regulate
criminal behavior through private contracts, but prosecutors exercise more
discretion now than before in deciding not to prosecute. Public law defines
the conditions for a nuclear reactor to run, but those fences give way to a
gentlemen’s agreement, and that gentlemen’s agreement depends on local
government and local consensus. Black letter norms give way to back door
consensus.
The analysis could stop here. But there is another dimension to this
discussion, and it relates to the actors. Who defines these layers of the law?
In each of these examples, they are institutional actors. Businesses draft the
detailed leases and work rules. The national government implements
comprehensive regulatory regimes governing use of nuclear power and
attempts to reduce crime. In each of these examples, detailed definitions
give way to equitable or consensus-driven norms. These equitable norms
are also defined by institutional actors—the judiciary, or prosecutor’s office,
or local government officials.
What is missing from this picture is that individuals, not institutions,
drive the process. Individuals are the ones rattling the fences, pursuing an
equitable resolution despite the language of the contract or the law, and they
are increasingly willing to do so through the courts. As depicted in
Appendix B, the numbers of civil filings show an almost uninterrupted rise
during the postwar period. 514 In 1949, 41,086 civil actions were filed in
district courts in Japan.515 By 2009, that number was over 259,000.516 The
change in summary court claims is rarely discussed, but even more
pronounced. In 1949, claimants filed 5,197 suits.517 In 2009, claimants filed
686,000.518 Recent statistics for all summary court filings, including those
514

See Appendix B, infra.
Id.
516
Somusho Tōkeikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications, Statistics Bureau], Soshō
Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (2004-2009), http://www.stat.go.jp/
data/nenkan/25.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
517
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Saibansho no Shinju Jikensu no Suii (1949-2002),
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/zinsokuka_kentoukai/01/sinzyu2.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2012).
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for debt collection and conciliation, are down significantly. 519 But the
number of civil cases litigated in summary courts continues to rise. 520
Japanese individuals show an ever-increasing willingness to go to court over
the small stuff.521
In the public law realm, local consensus now comes with increasing
citizen participation. Administrative law claims have trended higher over
the past two decades. 522 A former Supreme Court justice describes the
change in rights consciousness as “people’s eyes have opened,” and they no
longer accept the government as an absolute.523 March 11 accelerated this.
An “insidious legacy” of March 11 is “shaken trust” in the government.524
This increasing willingness to file civil claims and decreasing
willingness to trust the government combines with two important
demographic trends also depicted in Appendix B. The first relates to Japan’s
population. Scholars suggest that the “Japanese are disappearing in slow
motion.”525 The U.N. projects that Japan’s 2010 population of 127 million
will shrink by 20% by 2050.526 By 2075, Japan’s Statistics Bureau estimates
a population of 68 million, about half the current population.527
Compare that to a second important demographic trend: the increase
in legal service providers. In 1950, there were 5,827 attorneys in Japan.528
519
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520
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Soshō Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (2004-2009), supra note 523;
Somusho Tōkeikyoku, Soshō Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (1985-2004),
www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/28-15-b.xls (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). See also Luke Nottage &
Stephen Green, Who Defends Japan?: Government Lawyers and Judicial System Reform in Japan, 13
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 129, 137, 141-145, 171 (2011).
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In 2010, there were 28,789.529 Over the past two decades alone, attorney
numbers have approximately doubled.530 Since the first group of law school
graduates passed the new bar exam in 2006, attorney numbers have
increased by approximately 1,700 per year. 531 Setting aside the Judicial
System Reform Council’s goal to admit 3,000 new attorneys per year and
assuming increases similar to those since 2006, 532 the population of
attorneys will double again in the next two decades. Even if policy changes
and pass-rates decline, the attorney population will continue to increase as
the general population decreases. Over 30% of registered attorneys today
have practiced less than five years, suggesting that most within this group
are relatively young and likely to practice for the foreseeable future.533
The number of judicial scriveners has increased as well, and the scope
of services they provide grown. 534 The Japan Federation of Judicial
Scriveners reported 19,638 registered judicial scriveners for 2009, compared
to 13,500 in 1989.535 The number of administrative scriveners has increased
significantly. 536 The Japan Federation of Administrative Scrivener
Associations listed 42,328 registered administrative scriveners for 2011,
compared to 16,000 in 1989.537 The number of students graduating with an
undergraduate degree in law has declined in recent years, but continued to
average over 40,000 per year over the past decade.538 Demographic trends
suggest a rapidly declining general population and a rapidly increasing
population of legal professionals.
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Nihon Bengōshi Rengōkai [Japanese Federation of Bar Associations], Hōsō Jinkō Seisaku ni Kan
Suru Kinkyu Teigen, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/2011/110327.html (last
visited March 1, 2012).
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Justice System Reform Council, supra note 72, at 134.
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See Japanese Federation of Bar Associations, Bengōshi no Jissei Chart 1-1, supra note 530, at 1.
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The numbers can’t help but influence the role that law plays in
Japanese society. One can no longer ride the trains without seeing
advertisements for legal assistance.539 Judicial scriveners offer twenty-four
hour hotlines to consult on debt restructuring.540 Japanese attorneys, once
primarily denizens of the courtroom, now advertise for business writing
wills and contracts.541 They will help probate estates, divide up assets after
divorce or a death in the family, or help restructure debts. 542 They will
pursue pain and suffering (isharyō) claims following an auto accident and
help with insurance and housing problems. 543 They offer evening and
weekend office hours, will respond for free to telephone and email inquiries,
and offer payment plans “that won’t be a burden.”544
How does this tie into the layers of the law found in Japan?
Bargaining in Japan happens first within the shadow of the contract and, if
challenged, then within the shadow of the law and the “consensus of
society.” Absent challenge, the detailed lease controls, even if it conflicts
with case law. Absent challenge, the work rules prevail, even if they directly
conflict with case law. Unless ‘local consensus’ demands otherwise, public
regulation controls.
What happens if challenge comes cheaper? There are more
challenges to primary attempts at ordering. There is greater reliance on the
courts, which apply equitable principles. There are more challenges to and
through local governments, which seek to craft local consensus. Even as
Japanese law grows more complex and legal rights and obligations are
defined in greater detail, challenges to those defined rights and obligations
will continue. Secondary layers of the law, Professor Kawashima’s “rights
that exist but don’t exist”—will remain important. Understanding the role of
primary ordering, based on detailed rights and obligations, and secondary
ordering, based equity and the “consensus” of society, is fundamental to
understanding the role that law plays in the Japan of today and will play in
the Japan of tomorrow.
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APPENDIX A545

545

Charts based on Cabinet Office, Jikomae no Waga Kuno no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei nado no
Wakugumi, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/topics/2011/pdf/02-shikumi.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2012);
Mombukagaskusho [MEXT], Genshiryoku/Hōshasen Anzen Kakuho; Kantei [Cabinet Office], Genshiryoku
Kisei no Tame no Atarashii Taisei Ni Tsuite, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/genshiryokukisei.html
(last visited July 31, 2012).
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APPENDIX B546

546

Charts based on Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Saibansho no Shinju Jikensu no Suii, supra note 517;
Somusho Tōkeikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications, Statistics Bureau], Jinkō no Suii to
Shōrai no Jinkō, supra note 530, at 2-1; Nihon Bengōshi Rengōkai [Japanese Federation of Bar
Associations], Hōsō Jinkō Seisaku ni Kan Suru Kinkyu Teigen, supra note 533 at 1; Nikkei Guro-karu
[Nikkei Global], De-ta de Miru Chiiki—Bengōshi to Shihō Shoshi no Zōkaritsu, NIKKEI GURO-KARU No.
115 (Jan. 5, 2009) available at www.nikkei-rim.net/glocal/glocal_pdf/115PDF/115data.pdf.

